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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the political style and public image of Venezuelan President 
Hugo Chávez.  It argues that Chávez fulfills the criteria of a classical populist, in 
accordance with renowned cases of populism in Latin American history.  His style is 
further analyzed through Chávez’s relationship with his Venezuelan supporters and his 
diplomacy in the Latin American community.   Three characteristics are emphasized:  the 
radicalism of his image and policy, a casual and accessible approach, and the use of 
historical references.  This thesis relies on primary sources such as speeches, interviews, 
and government publications, as well as media coverage of the Chávez regime.  This 
study expounds the polarization of Venezuelan politics under Chávez, and connects his 
leadership to a larger trend in Latin American history.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 Hugo Raphael Chávez Frías was a relatively unknown figure when he burst on to 
the political scene and won the 1998 Venezuelan presidential elections with a stunning 
56% of the popular vote.  Since that time, Chávez has become one of the most visible 
politicians in the world, frequently mentioned in international news.  His involvement in 
important debates over themes such as capitalism and oil politics has elevated his status 
as a global leader in current affairs. 
 From an uncertain beginning filled with much speculation and debate over what 
kind of leadership Chávez would bring – some called him a military dictator-in-the-
waiting, others a communist, or a dangerous populist – Chávez has now firmly 
established himself as a radical thinker, a spokesperson for the poor and 
underrepresented, and a vocal opponent against imperialism and neoliberalism.  
However, Chávez is not an “open and closed” book, but a man of multi-faceted character.  
Chávez is self-admittedly ever-changing, a function, some say, of his growing intellectual 
and political maturity.   
Today Chávez is arguably the most renown figure in modern Latin American 
politics, rising above Fidel Castro, the long-time emblem of an alternative economic 
model and the epitome of anti-Americanism in the western hemisphere.  Chávez is now 
the most vocal opponent to the United States’ system of free-market capitalism, while 
strongly advocating increased solidarity among Latin American countries.  Furthermore, 
regional politics are changing dramatically in the South.  Latin America is undergoing a 
dramatic ideological shift, away from the strongly neoliberal dominance of the 1980s to a 
left-leaning progressive position.  Currently, Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, 
Uruguay, and Bolivia all have leftist governments in place, while several other countries 
approach election time with prominent leftist candidates in the running.  Chávez is an 
important reason for this wind of change sweeping the region.  His bold diplomacy and 
preferential trade undoubtedly have contributed to Latin America’s confidence in 
choosing a different direction than the United States’ Washington-Consensus1 based, 
IMF-inspired agenda. 
As a leader in all of these areas, Chávez was bound to concern the United States, 
especially as Venezuela is one of the world’s largest oil exporters, providing roughly 
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15% of U.S. oil imports.  Consequently, the U.S. administration has kept a close watch 
on this “renegade” president, and professed their concern over his policies. Chávez is also 
of interest for academics.  Venezuela has been one of the bastions of stable and working 
democracy in the typically volatile region of Latin America.  Many political scientists 
and commentators have lamented the rise of Chávez, a former military officer, and the 
apparent dismantling of the democracy in Venezuela.  All of these factors speak to 
Chávez’s prominence as an international figure worthy of serious attention. 
 
THE PURPOSE OF THIS THESIS 
This thesis will examine Chávez’s political style and public image, in an attempt 
to explain his popularity and determine key characteristics in his interaction with 
Venezuelan supporters and Latin American leaders.  To begin, Chávez will be examined 
through the lens of Latin American populism, helping readers understand the legacy of 
charismatic and progressive leadership in Latin American history and the context in 
which Chávez arose.  To follow, Chávez’s image and style will be analyzed through his 
interaction with two main groups - his Venezuelan supporters and Latin American leaders 
– focusing on three key themes that are important in shaping his image: political 
radicalism, a personable and accessible approach, and the use of history. 
In this manner, I hope to show why Chávez has been as successful as he has. It is 
not my intention to judge the merit or morality of Chávez and his movement, but merely 
analyze the reasons for his current popularity. As my objective is to explain Chávez’s 
appeal, I have focused on the favourable elements on which his political image is 
constructed.  I have also highlighted some of the major criticisms of this controversial 
leader in order to present a more balanced representation.  It is difficult to assess the 
degree to which his policy or his rhetoric has most influenced Chávez’s supporters and 
colleagues.  Presumably, empty rhetoric would not have resulted in such immense 
political success, in terms of his favourable electoral outcomes and diplomatic advances 
in the Latin American community.  Likewise, policy alone would not have generated the, 
at times, fanatical loyalty of his supporters, without the power of Chávez’s provocative 
and passionate speech.  My intention is to provide a thorough examination of the motifs 
of Chávez’s political style and image, which include both discourse and policy. 
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With this objective in mind, the sources required for my research are mostly 
Chávez’s direct speech, as acquired through interviews, public speeches and broadcasts, 
video footage, and government publications.  Much of this material is accessible through 
the internet. The Venezuelan government has an extensive on-line service, providing 
many kinds of information to the Venezuelan people and the world.  Presidential 
addresses are regularly posted on this site.  The broadcast of Chávez’s interactive 
radio/television program, “Aló Presidente,” allows me to examine his weekly discourse 
with the public. Many other public services, such as policy announcements and status 
reports on the “Missions,” are available through this medium. 
In the scope of this project, several historical questions will be addressed.  What political 
techniques have been successful in Chávez’s case, and how are they related to earlier 
populists?  Is populism still a viable option in contemporary politics?  Has Chávez 
changed the populist model to account for Venezuela’s particular economy and society?  
How malleable is populism to these changes?  In addressing these questions it will be 
necessary to explore the definition of populism and how classical and modern forms 
differ.  
 
HISTORIOGRAPHY 
Because Hugo Chávez is a relatively new figure, there has not yet been adequate 
scholarship conducted on his character or his governance.  As Chávez’s fame and 
popularity continue to grow, newly published works emerge ceaselessly, but few of these 
are academically rigorous or provide much of the historical context for Chávez.  A small 
number of historians have done decisive works in this area.  Richard Gott’s book Hugo 
Chávez and the Bolívarian Revolution (the 2005 follow-up of his earlier In the Shadow of 
the Liberator: Hugo Chávez and the Transformation of Venezuela, 2001) is one valuable 
contribution. Gott, a British journalist and historian specializing in Latin America, 
provides the first significant English-language study that places Chávez into a historical 
and intellectual perspective.  His book walks the reader through the various stages of 
Chávez’s personal life and presents a thorough description of the Bolívarian movement, 
its origins, allies, objectives, and achievements.  His attention to Venezuela’s nineteenth 
century revolutionary experience is noteworthy, particularly his explanation of Bolívar’s 
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place in Venezuela’s historic identity.  The 2002 doctoral thesis by Marines Morela 
Fornerino-Steeves of the University of Indiana also offers significant examination.   This 
political scientist observes the democratic nature of Chávez’s movement and draws 
attention to the importance of oil in not only Venezuelan political economy, but in the 
very psyche of the Venezuelan people.  Michael McCaughan’s Battle of Venezuela is a 
good overview for the public, describing Chávez’s background, the nature of Venezuelan 
contemporary politics, and the progress of the Bolívarian movement. Julia Buxton’s The 
Failure of Political Reform in Venezuela, published in 2001, is valuable in describing the 
historical background of Venezuela’s political economy.  Her book explains the 
democratic deterioration in Venezuela which produced the favourable conditions for 
Chávez’s rise to power. 
Various scholars have provided concentrated analysis on specific aspects of 
Chávez and his presidency.  The book Venezuelan Politics in the Chávez Era, published 
in 2004, compiles works from numerous scholars well recognized in their respective 
fields of study.  The book deals with economic policy by Julia Buxton, popular opinion 
by Patricia Marquez, labour by Steve Ellner, and social polarization by Kenneth Roberts.  
Academics like Steve Ellner (the co-editor of the aforementioned book), Kenneth 
Roberts, Kurt Weyland, and Kirk Hawkins have also published numerous articles in 
academic journals about Venezuelan politics under Chávez. 
Despite these contributions, certain potential areas of scholarly enquiry on Chávez 
have been overlooked, especially works that place Chávez in a regional and contextual 
analysis.  A comparative study of Chávez’s policies and style does not exist.  Chávez has 
emerged as a principle leader in the current leftist slant in Latin America.  Additionally, 
the leadership style of Chávez should be examined in juxtaposition with comparable 
individuals throughout Latin America’s past and present, especially Latin American 
populists.  The study of twentieth century Latin American populism would include 
figures such as Juan Perón (Argentina), Getúlio Vargas (Brazil), José María Velasco 
Ibarra (Ecuador), to name only a few.  A famous contemporary, Fidel Castro of Cuba is 
also a worthy case for comparison.  
There are many scholarly works on populism to draw upon for this analysis.  
However, work on Latin American populism is more limited.  Michael Conniff, a leading 
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scholar in this field, was the editor of two books, Latin American Populism in 
Comparative Perspective (1982) and Populism in Latin America (1999), which are 
indispensable for the application of this political theory to regional cases.  These books 
discuss the origins and development of populism in Latin America, while situating it in 
specific cases throughout the twentieth century. Carlos de la Torre’s Populist Seduction 
in Latin America: the Ecuadorian Experience (2000) is a knowledgeable account of 
Ecuadorian populism, as well as populist theories in general, most noteworthy for its 
sociological analysis on the populist-follower relationship. Weyland and Roberts have 
made significant contributions in this area, both addressing the case of Chávez 
specifically.  Additionally, Sheila Collins’ article, entitled “Breaking the Mold? 
Venezuela’s Defiance of the Neoliberal Agenda,” is a useful source for examination of 
Chávez’s economic policies, which harkens back to classical populist polities in the midst 
of neoliberal dominance. 
A number of book-length interviews have also been published.  Aleida Guevara 
March conducted a series of interviews that were published in 2005 in Chávez, 
Venezuela, and the New Latin America.   Marta Harnecker’s Understanding the 
Bolívarian Revolution: Hugo Chávez talks to Marta Harnecker (along with an earlier 
Spanish version: Un Hombre, Un Pueblo) was published in late 2005.  Agustin Blanco 
Muñoz’s publication is of special importance because it gives insight on the early 
Chávez; Habla el Comandante, published in 1999, consists of fourteen interviews 
conducted in the years between Chávez’s release from prison in March 1994 and his 
presidential campaign in June 1998.  As this period was a time of serious evolution in 
Chávez’s political thought, it is a very valuable resource. Also a Havana publishing house 
released The Fascist Coup against Venezuela in 2003, a compilation of speeches by 
Chávez from December 2002 to January 2003. 
Another resource that has become quite important to this project is the 
Venezuelan online news distributor, www.venezuelanalysis.com. This media outlet is 
pro-Chávez amid the overwhelmingly hostile media coverage of Chávez’s career and 
presents articles from many different contributors.  Additionally, articles published in 
Venezuelan newspapers throughout Chávez’s career, collected from the National Library 
in Caracas, have given insight into how Chávez is portrayed outside his control.  Because 
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my research is primarily based in media sources, it is, therefore, crucial to understand the 
complex nature of the various media sources I use before delving into the main purpose 
of my thesis. 
 
MEDIA CHALLENGES 
Although he has now served as president for eight years, the character of Hugo 
Chávez is still somewhat endowed with mystery.  Why is this so? There are many reasons 
the image of Chávez in the media and in academic discussion is confused and 
contradictory. 
 One reason for this is that media coverage of Chávez has been decidedly 
antagonistic, (with growing exception outside of the U.S.) painting him as a dictator and 
troublemaker. The Venezuelan media has been overwhelmingly in opposition to Chávez. 
As might be expected, the media in Venezuela is owned by the upper class, who fall 
decisively in the anti-Chavista camp, and thus use their control over the media to try to 
undermine the legitimacy of the government and to weaken the president’s popular 
support.2 A culture of ethical responsibility in the media has never developed in 
Venezuela and therefore reporting suffers from a general lack of integrity and 
accountability. The constant misinformation and blatant fabrications presented in the 
news are due to the polarized political, economic, and social environment within 
Venezuela. 
From the beginning, the owners of media outlets in Venezuela have applied their 
resources in an effort to remove Chávez from office.  They used many different tactics.  
Chávez’s military background was immediately called into question, with warnings from 
the press of his authoritarian tendencies.  His relationship with Castro was an easy target; 
accusations that Chávez would turn Venezuela into another Cuba were frequent.  During 
the 1998 election, old photos of Chávez embracing Castro were printed, with the caption 
reading “Traitor” and calling Chávez a subordinate of Castro.3  Chávez claims that, 
during the campaign, an oppositional radio company even hired a professional actor who 
imitated Chávez’s voice and made outrageous threats to his opponents.4   
In April 2002, the media owners went beyond blatant propaganda and criticism to 
collaborate in a full-blown conspiracy to overthrow the government.  A more flagrant 
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attempt at a media’s abuse of power can hardly be found than in this case.  On April 11th 
-13th, a military coup was staged which temporarily removed Chávez from power.  
During these events, the private television channels either told the public that Chávez had 
resigned and that ‘everything was under control’ or, they completely ignored the 
attempted coup.   As Venezuelan journalist, Eva Golinger, says, “This was an intentional 
distortion of news and censorship of the truth about a situation of critical importance to 
Venezuelan citizens and the international community.”5 (Meanwhile, most U.S. media 
welcomed the new government, telling the American public that Venezuelan democracy 
was safe now that Chávez had ‘resigned’.6)  As the only government station was removed 
from the air, the public was largely unaware of the situation.  Eventually the truth of 
Chávez’s capture spread to the people by word of mouth, cell phones, and an emergency 
news bulletin assembled by a municipal press.7  On April 13th, the government-owned 
station came back on the air, and soon afterwards, a massive protest of Chávez supporters 
filled the streets.  In the early morning, Venezuela’s democratically elected president was 
returned to power.   
Also, the role of the media in the opposition’s initial success in the 2002 coup 
should be explored in further detail.  The media was not only active in concealing the 
military revolt, but also in the unfolding of events preceding the revolt.  On April 11th, 
two simultaneous rallies were held, one pro-government and one oppositional.  When the 
marches turned physical, the media manipulated images to show the Chavistas as the 
perpetrators of the ensuing violence.  The media footage incited anger and fear among the 
upper classes and triggered more conflict and fervid support for physical action against 
the government.  Interestingly, the victims of the shooting were almost all Chavistas, and 
a closer look at the footage shows that the bullets of Chavista demonstrators were aimed 
atop a building where an alleged sniper had fired several shots.  They were not shooting 
into “an unarmed peaceful crowd of opposition demonstrators”, as told by the media.8  
The “media coup” of April 2002 is an extreme case of media manipulation and 
propaganda.  This incidence explicitly illustrates the powerful impact of the media on the 
political stability of a government body.   Therefore, gaining authority over the media in 
Venezuela has always been an issue of primary concern for Chávez.  In order to gain 
media access, Chávez had to confront the Venezuelan private media industry, which 
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openly despised him, and develop new media outlets to counter the negative portrayal 
and outright lies of his opponents.  
Aside from the elitist and partisan Venezuelan media, international news has also 
been very critical of Chávez’s government.  The United States media has pursued a 
particularly antagonistic posture, attacking Chávez with allegations of authoritarian rule, 
communist intentions, corruption, and abuse of power.  An analysis conducted by Eric 
Wingerter of Venezuela Information Office found that in the Los Angeles Times, only one 
of the 28 editorials on Chávez written since 1998 was not significantly disparaging.  
Chávez is regularly described as “caudillo,” “dictator,” and “strongman” in these 
articles.9  A similar study by Justin Delacour for the news website Venezuelanalysis 
documented the serious criticisms made in six U.S. newspapers during a short period 
(April 2002 to October 2004).  He states that for every citation from the only two pro-
Chávez Venezuelan historians, there were more than seventeen citations from anti-
Chávez analysts.10   
Since 1998, but especially after the 2002 coup, alternative media enterprises have 
been developed.11  Several public radio and television stations now broadcast national 
news and government announcements, offering a different perspective on events.  The 
international community as well has become more receptive to Chávez with the exception 
of the United States whose major media coverage on Chávez is routinely disparaging.   
However, media like Telesur, Vive television, and other programs paid or 
supplemented by the Venezuelan government (or others which are openly pro-Chávez) 
must also be viewed with a critical eye, as they are certainly not above bias and agenda-
seeking.  In fact, there have been serious allegations of curtailment of press freedom.  For 
example, Chávez has legislated that private networks televise certain government 
announcements that are of “national importance.”  These mandatory national broadcasts, 
called “cadenas”, are recurrent and often last several hours at a time, evoking protest 
from the media.12  Additionally, legislation was passed in January 2002 “to defend the 
right of Venezuelans to truthful information.”  This law strives to hold the media outlets 
accountable to honest programming.13  However, the negative potential of this law has 
led to many objections.14  Such fears were warranted on December 28, 2005 when 
Chávez announced the non-renewal of Radio Caracas Television’s operating license.  
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Numerous human rights groups have condemned this move as an attempt to silence 
criticism of his regime, as RCTV is one of Chávez’s harshest critics.15 
The extraordinary polarization of contemporary Venezuelan politics makes 
objective journalism scarce and has been an obstacle to gaining a more profound 
understanding of Chávez and his government.  For this reason, critical scholarship on this 
subject is in particular need.  It is my hope that this thesis will attend to some of these 
inadequacies.  First, in order to understand these complexities and controversies, we must 
examine not only Chávez’s time in the presidency, but also his personal background and 
Venezuela’s history. 
 
VENEZUELAN HISTORY 
 In a region where political instability is a curse, and dictatorship and violent 
overthrow of governments are the norms, Venezuela’s history has been quite exceptional.  
Venezuela’s long-standing stable democracy has been an anomaly.  Economically 
Venezuela was also considered a success story.  Set apart from Latin America’s history 
of poverty, Venezuela has enjoyed economic prosperity for the past century.   As the fifth 
largest oil exporter in the world, Venezuela has benefited from enormous revenues, 
creating a high-class culture reminiscent of the finest European centers.  The metropolis 
of Caracas, Venezuela’s largest city with a present population of five million, boasts 
grand architecture, large and exotic shopping centers, and an extensive subway system.  
By appearance, therefore, Venezuela has seemingly evaded the dreary fate of many Latin 
American countries. 
Events of the 1990s, however, brought out the ugly truth of the situation. Despite 
the city’s modernity and affluence, one need not look far to notice the hypocrisy of this 
illusion.  The reality is that the government sits atop the largest reserve of oil in the 
hemisphere, yet a 1995 statistic shows upwards of 70% of Venezuelans live in poverty.16 
Another study finds similar results, stating that in the last twenty years alone $250 billion 
was made in oil income for the country.  In spite of this, fifteen million people are living 
in poverty.17  While the small upper class flew off to Miami for weekend shopping 
excursions,18 67% of the people struggled to get by on $2 USD a day.19 The country’s oil 
wealth had for years gone directly into the pockets of politicians, the business elite, and 
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foreign enterprises, leaving the common Venezuelans with substandard social conditions. 
The oil boom in the 1970s gave the impression of opulence despite dramatic inequalities, 
but a sudden decline a decade later accentuated economic and social injustices.  The 
effects of sudden price increases, dollar devaluation, and cuts to welfare spending were 
felt throughout society, with the middle and lower classes suffering the brunt of the 
depression.  The hardships caused a drop in the middle class, from 28% of the population 
to 9%, over the last fifteen years.20  “People are very angry at this miracle in reverse,” 
says Venezuelan scholar Arturo Uslar Pietri, who claims that Venezuela should be by far 
the richest country in Latin America.21   
As the economy suffered, the political system also came under serious scrutiny.22  
What became plainly obvious was that Venezuelan democracy was merely a façade.  
While times were good, people were willing to accept the government’s many flaws, but 
in the midst of economic depression and elevated social tensions, the people became 
increasingly angry and cynical of the political order.  The government rarely ever 
changed hands and was run exclusively by the elite members of society.  Aside from 
voting privileges, the regular people had no contribution to political affairs.  The common 
people were increasingly squeezed out of the political arena.  As one scholar states, 
“Clientelist parties determined everything – from members of the Supreme Court, 
mayors, provincial governors and heads of the national labour federation down to the 
leadership of student groups, private clubs, and even contestants in the Miss Venezuela 
contest.”23 
The former political system was established in 1958 when the “Pacto de Punto 
Fijo” was made, an agreement between the two dominant political parties to share power.  
The moderately liberal Democratic Action (AD) and the more conservative Christian 
Democratic Party (COPEI) dominated Venezuelan politics until the turn of the century.  
Over the years, divisions between the state and the party grew as state finances were 
distributed to build ‘parallel’ organizations, and combat the influence of the Communist 
Party, which was a force in Venezuelan politics.24 As Daniel Hellinger states, “divisions 
within party ranks were assuaged by common interest in gaining the largest share of 
power in the rent-seeking and rent-distributing state.”25  Therefore, the AD and COPEI 
parties maintained this fragile agreement in order to preserve their privileged status.  This 
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system, dubbed “Parti-ocracy” or “Pacted Democracy”, effectively excluded the common 
people, and alternative parties, from participation in government, and thus any say in the 
economic or social affairs of the country.  In this divided and inequitable context, Hugo 
Raphael Chávez Frías arose. 
 
CHÁVEZ’S PERSONAL BACKGROUND 
Born on July 28th, 1954 in a village called Sabaneta, in the Andean state of 
Barinas, Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías was one of four children.  The son of schoolteachers, 
Chávez naturally had a passion for learning, developing a love for history and literature at 
an early age.  Chávez was also a gifted athlete and excelled in baseball.  It was this 
passion that helped lead him to a career with the military.  Hoping to further his prospects 
as a pro-baseball pitcher, Chávez signed up for military service in 1971 at age seventeen 
and moved to the “big city.”  Being a young man in Caracas, where the social division 
was glaring, accelerated the development of his social consciousness.  Also, Chávez was 
awakened by the enlightened culture of Caracas’ Símon Bolívar University.  In the 
1970s, a series of changes in the military led to the enactment of “Plan Andrés Bello”, 
which facilitated the inscription of young officers in the Venezuelan universities as an 
alternative to military institutions.  Officers began university placements as a way to 
obtain necessary skills for nation building.  Consequently when these young cadets 
finished their university schooling, they possessed professional skills, civilian contacts, 
and social sensitivity, which helps explain the political consciousness and activism in the 
contemporary Venezuelan military.26  These experiences helped produce a keen political 
interest in Chávez.  
On December 17, 1982, under the famous Samán de Güere tree (a national 
historic site in Venezuela), the Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario 200 (MBR-200) 
was formed. Here, Chávez and two comrades27 pledged to change the government which 
they held to be corrupt and unjust.  Here, they swore Símon Bolívar’s historic oath, which 
he vowed under that same tree 200 years earlier: “I swear before you, and I swear before 
the God of my fathers, that I will not allow my arms to relax, nor my soul to rest, until I 
have broken the chains that oppress us…”28 Though their goals were unspecified and 
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vague, these men were passionate about the need for change, and they remained 
committed in their pursuit of it.  
Chávez spread his newfound social vision to his colleagues and underlings. He 
used his position as class lecturer at the military academy of Caracas, which he held from 
1980-85, to provoke and question young military officers and instill political 
consciousness.  At times, however, Chávez’s revolutionary ideas alarmed his superiors.  
In 1986, due to growing suspicion of a possible insurrection among the youth, Chávez 
was transferred out of Caracas to the remote location of Elorza in the state of Apure (in 
the southwest near the Columbian border).  This did not discourage him, however.  In the 
new post, Chávez pursued his search for life’s truths and political ideals for the country.  
He spent time talking and learning from the Indigenous peoples in the area while 
coordinating civic-military projects and community development initiatives. By 
someone’s great oversight, Chávez was transferred back into Caracas, and positioned in 
the Miraflores Palace, which enabled him to reconnect with his comrades and resume his 
conspiratorial planning.29  
His efforts were facilitated by a dramatic event which validated all of Chávez’s 
revolutionary views and aroused sympathy and anger from many in the military: the 
Caracazo of February 27, 1989.  When President Carlos Andrés Peréz instituted much-
hated neoliberal reforms – austerity measures to combat low revenues from the oil market 
decline – thousands of people took to the streets in violent protest.  Price increases, 
particularly in bus fare, enraged Venezuelans.  In Caracas and other centers around the 
country, riots broke out.  To re-establish order, Andrés Peréz ordered the military to use 
extreme measures, causing perhaps one thousand deaths (the exact figure is unknown, 
some argue that the number is closer to 2000), and a strong resentment within the military 
towards the government which had pitted them against their own countrymen, whom they 
were supposed to protect.  This discontent was a major catalyst in the politicization of the 
Venezuelan military. 
After years of plotting, Chávez and his cohorts decided to take action on February 
4, 1992 and attempted to overthrow Perez’s government.  Simultaneous action was to be 
taken in key military and government posts across the country.  Because of numerous 
betrayals and certain miscalculations, the coup attempt was a failure. Chávez was 
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captured but was granted a few moments of airtime to speak to his supporters.  In his 
press debut, Chávez accepted responsibility for the coup’s failure and appealed for people 
to put down their arms and surrender in order to avoid any more unnecessary bloodshed.  
He apologized and announced that they were putting down their weapons “por ahora” 
indicating that he would later try again. This very brief moment gave him critical national 
exposure. “Por Ahora” became somewhat of a rallying cry.  As reported in the daily 
journal El Universal, “The Venezuelan people refer to this celebrated phrase ‘For Now’ 
as when democracy opened its door to Hugo Chávez Frías with the task to complete his 
promise of transformation.”30  This was indeed significant because not only was Chávez 
promising that he would continue to fight for change, but he humbly and honestly 
accepted responsibility for his actions – a rare case indeed for Venezuelan politics. 
 A similar overthrow was attempted only ten months later by other dissident 
military officers, but also failed.  Shortly thereafter President Carlos Andrés Peréz was 
impeached on charges of corruption and misappropriation of state funds.  In a gesture of 
goodwill, and in view of popular empathy for the coup conspirators, the subsequent 
president, Rafael Caldera, ordered the release of Chávez. 
 It was then that Chávez decided to seek change through the ballot rather than the 
bullet.  After his release from prison Chávez began traveling extensively, securing 
important alliances from disengaged political parties like MAS (Movement Towards 
Socialism) and Causa R (Radical Cause).  In 1997, the new political party The Movement 
for the Fifth Republic (MVR – Movimiento Quinta (V) Republica) was formed.  
  
1998 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
The 1998 elections occurred during a long period of evident dissatisfaction with 
the government and the entire political system.  There was a genuine desire for change in 
a huge sector of the Venezuelan population.  As one commentator says, in the 1990s the 
people had a real sense of “moving forward.”31 This desire was evident in pop culture: 
everything from colloquial language on the streets, which poked fun at politics, to the 
parodies of themes and characters of the very popular Venezuelan soap operas.32  As 
expressed in the violent outbursts of the Caracazo and marked support for the 1992 
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coups, there was an authentic revolutionary posture in the voters in the national elections 
throughout the 1990s.   
 Many Venezuelans favoured radical economic change.  For example, President 
Carlos Andrés Peréz was elected on a campaign of anti-IMF austerity programs, which he 
blatantly betrayed early in his presidency, causing the violent outcry of February 1989.  
From Andrés Peréz onward, all politicians campaigned on anti-neoliberal platforms.33  
 More than just economic change, Venezuelans wanted an overhaul of the whole 
political system.  The clientalism of the dual-party system had intensified and was well 
known.  The major political parties lost support.  In the following presidential elections, 
there was an outright rejection of all established parties. In 1988, the AD and COPEI 
received 93% of the vote, but by 1993, combined the two parties received less than 
50%.34  The 1994 president-elect, Rafael Caldera, the former COPEI leader, won his 
presidency as an independent. 
 Therefore, Chávez’s main competitor in the 1998 elections was not from either of 
the traditional parties, but an independent, Henrique Salas Römer.  In the early part of the 
race, the competition appeared relatively even.35 Once AD and COPEI realized that they 
were ‘out of the running’ they abandoned their own candidates and threw their support 
behind Römer in an attempt to stop Chávez.  Their backing in fact had the reverse effect: 
Römer’s fate was sealed as he now was perceived as a candidate of the establishment.  
Many gave their vote to Chávez, who was consequently seen as the only true option for 
change.36  
 Some scholars argue even further to say that Chávez was elected simply because 
of the people’s contempt for the entrenched parties.  Julia Buxton points out that 
abstention totaled 36% and consequently Chávez came to power with the support of only 
one-third of the electorate, even though it was the highest majority win in Venezuela’s 
democratic history.As she puts it, “His [Chávez’s] victory should more rightly be viewed 
as a rejection of the old system, rather than a positive endorsement of the new Bolivarian 
vision.  Chávez won power because all opportunities for peaceful revolutionary political 
changed had been blocked and exhausted.”37   I am of the opinion, however, that 
Chávez’s election was more than simply by default.  Chávez offered many ideas and 
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programs that were enticing, and he presented an image that related well to the 
Venezuelan poor.   
 Hugo Chávez has served as president for over eight years and has repeatedly 
verified his popularity through numerous elections and referendums.38  Chávez’s 
popularity is substantial and enduring.  In this thesis, I intend to illustrate how Chávez 
rose to such prominence by examining his relationships with two target groups: the poor 
majority in Venezuela and the Latin American community.  First, however, it is useful to 
examine Chávez’s political style within an established framework.  Populism, as I will 
show, has produced numerous leaders throughout history who share similar 
characteristics. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
CHÁVEZ: AN EXAMPLE OF LATIN AMERICAN POPULISM? 
 
Chávez has frequently been labeled a populist, a label that has often carried 
negative connotations, suggesting unrealistic economic policies and a demagogic appeal 
to the masses. This assertion requires some attention, given the imprecise nature of the 
term.  This chapter explores both the history and meaning of populism.  It argues that the 
term has been inappropriately cast in a negative light and that once shed of its 
inappropriately negative connotations it is reasonable to consider Chávez a populist.  
Considering him in relation to other Latin American populist leaders helps us better 
understand his rule and his style. 
Populism is a political phenomenon that arose in the early twentieth century. The 
term has come to be used regularly, and loosely, to describe any political figure that fits 
such vague criteria as having strong charisma and a large lower-class following.  A leader 
who is simply popular is sometimes deemed “populist.”  It is no wonder, then, that 
scholars have called for a moratorium on the use of the word.1 However, the utility of 
this concept is not expended. Throughout history, certain politicians have stood out from 
the rest as outstanding leaders with exemplary personal appeal that crosses a broad 
spectrum of society, bringing promises of dramatic change.  These populists have had a 
significant impact on politics, which would be foolish to ignore. 
Part of the confused understanding of populism is due to its problematic heritage.  
A veil of negativity shrouds public perception of populist leaders.  Two main issues 
account for this:  their autocratic tendency and their poor economic record.  
 The style of government used by populists tends to be highly centralized. Because 
populist leaders rely so heavily on sustained allegiance from their followers, they often 
bypass formal legal procedures in order to rule in a way that pleases their support base.  
Though “the people” are often called upon to support their leader through rallies or 
elections, in practice, populism often ends up resembling an authoritarian dictatorship 
state, as political parties and institutions are weakened or totally dissolved.  In practice, 
the relationship between democracy and populism, is at best, strained.   In fact, political 
scientist Kirk Hawkins argues that populist attributes are inherently anti-democratic. He 
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says, “It is difficult and perhaps impossible to build democracy on the foundation of 
populism.”2 
 The second problem regarding populism’s unfavourable reputation is the failed 
economic record of historic populist leaders.  Despite numerous experiments, populist 
economics, characterized by government control of industry and a focus on redistribution 
of income, appear to be unsustainable in the long term. Scholars Rudiger Dornbusch and 
Sebastian Edwards call this “the self-destructive feature of populism” because the 
circularity of populist macroeconomic policies, they argue, has repeatedly led to inflation, 
crisis, and collapse of the economic system.3 The assertion that populist economics are 
fiscally irresponsible is so accepted that few now dare to travel that road.  Several recent 
leaders have risen to power with populist appeals, only to quickly abandon the economic 
policies that go hand-in-hand.  These about-face changes not only reinforce the belief that 
economic populism can not succeed, but also contribute to skepticism of the sincerity of 
populist leaders, whose charisma and showy rhetoric are already suspect. 
Historians and political scientists continue to strive for a definition of populism.  
Populism has been examined in a variety of ways.   Michael Conniff argues that populism 
is primarily political, with the most important characteristics being “urban, multiclass, 
electoral, expansive, ‘popular’, and led by charismatic figures.”4  Carlos de la Torre 
asserts that populism is most importantly a social relationship, based on the social 
construction of a leader.5  Kenneth Roberts lists four different perspectives: 
historical/sociological, economic, ideological, and political.6  These various foci speak to 
the tension over which elements are crucial to the nature of this phenomenon. The main 
issue in the current debate is whether economic policy should factor into this equation.  
Given the great disparity in academic understanding, how can we rescue populism from 
its present state of confusion?   
I understand populism as a multi-dimensional phenomenon.  Several distinct 
characteristics are consistently present in Latin American figures deemed populist, which 
help us understand this phenomenon in a meaningful way.   Their style of leadership and 
public interaction is unique, and has fostered a reciprocal relationship between leader and 
followers different from other political leaders.  Nonetheless, economic policies cannot 
be ignored, and inevitably play a decisive role in defining a leader and his legacy.  One’s 
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approach to economics affects other aspects of governance, and indeed, is greatly 
relevant in the everyday lives of the nation’s people.  However, we should not overstate 
its importance as a defining characteristic of populism.  After all, a leader can pursue 
populist-style economics without being a populist.  I agree with Francisco Panizza who 
stated that defining populism as strictly an economic program greatly reduces it to a 
narrow view, a “statist, inward-looking post-war model of development.”7 Instead, as a 
political representation, populism is much more flexible and able to address the differing 
temporal and regional experiences of its cases.   
There are those, however, that choose to disregard economics altogether.  As a 
result, the new categories of “classical populism” and “neopopulism” were created.  This 
view does not hold much weight, in my opinion, as the distinction lies heavily on the idea 
that neopopulism is essentially political populism without economic follow-through.   
Later in this chapter, I will discuss this debate in more detail, and give some examples of 
how the case of Chávez in particular discredits that argument. 
Even having narrowed down our definition as requiring a specific economic 
component, open debate still remains about the structural elements of populism.  What 
qualities are essential to constitute a populist label? While some have favored a very 
open-ended framework, I opt for a more specific list of criteria to help us classify this 
type of leadership.  However, I concede, like Kenneth Roberts, that not every element 
needs to be present in every case.8 A multi-dimensional notion of populism can help us 
better understand the different experiences within this tradition. 
Perhaps the best way to understand this phenomenon is by examining the history 
of populism.  Latin America has been influenced by populism more than any other 
region. It seems embedded in the political consciousness of the people who repeatedly are 
‘seduced’ (to use the words of de la Torre) by such leaders throughout the twentieth 
century.9  To illustrate the common elements I will draw comparisons from the most 
renowned cases of populism, as well as a more recent, contentious one.  The historical 
figures that will be discussed are Getúlio Vargas of Brazil (1930-45, 1951-54), José 
María Velasco Ibarra of Ecuador (1934-35, 1944-47, 1952-56, 1960-61, 1968-72), Juan 
Domingo Perón of Argentina (1946-55, 1973-74), and Fidel Castro of Cuba (1959-
present.) Through these cases, several characteristics are evident: 
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 (1) Charismatic, personalist style of leadership, often with paternalistic or messianic 
elements  
 
(2) Heterogeneous, multi-class following, frequently mobilized in support of one leader 
 
(3) Ambiguous ideology, with an “Us vs. Them” component, specifically, the lower 
classes against the elite.   
 
(4) Top-down style of governance that tends to be strongly presidentialist and centralized 
with low levels of institutionalization  
 
(5) Economic policies focused on redistribution of wealth and state control (or partial 
control) over industry 
 
Charisma is undoubtedly important for populists.  One example of a populist with 
exceptional charisma and the remarkable ability to rally support whenever necessary was 
Ecuador’s José Velasco Ibarra. His famous claim, “Give me a balcony and I will make 
myself president” rings true, given his outstanding record; Velasco won five presidential 
elections, running under various partisan banners.10  (Interestingly enough, he failed to 
complete a single full term, a common fate of populists.)  Fidel Castro is well known for 
his charisma and the ability to captivate an audience for hours with his natural, poetic, 
and impassioned speech.  
Populist leaders often exhibit a strong degree of religiosity in their image as 
leader.  Not only do they use religious language to support their cause but their followers 
often believe they are granted divine appointment.  Velasco Ibarra was seen as “Gran 
Ausente” (the Great Absentee) in contrast to the Liberals who incarnated sin, according 
to the social perception, and were therefore the reason for the country’s ills.11  Fidel 
Castro is often perceived by his supporters as the messiah and divine leader of the Cuban 
struggle.  The crowning moment of his divine blessing, in the eyes of the people, came 
during a public address shortly after the Revolution’s victory; as Castro spoke to a large 
and optimistic crowd, two doves descended and perched on his shoulder, and from then 
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on his authority as leader was sealed.12   In fact, this messianic quality strongly aligns 
with the presence of charisma in leadership style.  Originally, “charisma” referred 
specifically to a divine acknowledgement or appointment bestowed on a person, though 
the term has now been secularized.13 
Paternalism is also seen in several cases:  Juan Perón’s followers believed in their 
leader’s genuine care for their well-being, which was displayed early on through his visits 
to factories as the Minister of Labor.  Getúlio Vargas was fondly called “o Velho” (the 
old man) and the “boapraca” (the good fellow) for his amiability and the idea that 
“everything under his control would turn up right.”14  
Another similarity of populist leaders is that they receive support for a multi-class 
following.  The working classes typically comprise the majority of populist supporters, 
however, other sectors of society have offered support.   Castro maintains control of the 
Cuban armed forces, aided by his brother Raul Castro as Minister of Defense and the 
fresh memory of events such as the Bay of Pigs, the Missile Crisis, and several 
international missions.  Perón was a former military commander who had a somewhat 
precarious allegiance from the military.15 Perón also played upon bourgeoisie fears of 
communism to incorporate some middle class support, portraying himself as the 
moderate who could appease both sides.16 
The populists’ supporters are often called upon to demonstrate their allegiance 
through mass mobilization, rather than simply during election time.  This characteristic is 
prominent in all cases.  “Los descamisados” (the shirtless ones) gathered in great 
numbers to listen to Perón’s powerful balcony speeches to his followers, as well as in 
protest over his brief imprisonment in 1943.  These “carnivelesque” rallies were 
legendary, with songs, cheers and drums, and commemorations are still celebrated to this 
day in Argentina.17  Vargas tried to unite the working class in Brazil, where 
“trabalhadores” (labourers) and “opérios” (workers) were considered distinct (because of 
different educational background).  1945, the year of Vargas’ election, was a year of 
political awakening for the urban-industrial sectors, which had just recently been 
enfranchised.  Most backed Vargas in the “queremos” (for “Queremos Getúlio” – We 
want Getúlio”) campaign, which came alive in the streets of Brazil’s cities.18 Velasco’s 
1939 and 1944 presidential campaign relied heavily on messianism; his dramatized 
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returns from exile were festive processions, like the Redeemer coming to save the 
country.19  In Cuba, public gatherings and addresses are also quite normal, although they 
have lessened in recent years due to Castro’s age and health. 
Thirdly, populists tend to have a vague ideology.  The emphasis is on immediate 
and sustained popular support and thus an ambiguous platform is advantageous as to 
avoid alienating potential allies with specific ideological or tactical details.  As Michael 
Conniff points out, a common label for populist programs is often simply attaching 
“ismo” to the name of the leader: Perónismo, Getulismo, Adhemarismo, Velasquismo, 
Guitanismo, etc.20 Perón also famously used “the third way”, along with “Justicialismo”, 
to describe his ambiguous ideology.21  Velasco’s agenda was also vague and inconsistent.  
In the 1944 elections, his victory speech suggests how he was able to bring together 
conservative, communist, and excluded liberals in his ADE coalition: “I don’t serve any 
determined ideology.  I don’t serve any determined party.  I will be the Head of the State.  
I will be the servant of the people, the servant of Ecuador in search of nationality, of 
morality,...”22 Indeed a map displaying populist leaders throughout history would show a 
wide range of perspectives across the left and right, with some figures difficult to place.  
Even Castro, although he has always maintained his socialist identity, has shifted aspects 
of his ideology significantly over his forty-seven year rule.23  
Nonetheless, within the amorphous ideology of populist politics is a common 
reverence for “el pueblo.”  Populists often uphold the romanticized image of the people 
as righteous and faultless.  Defining “el pueblo” typically results in the creation of an 
enemy.  Some academics, such as de la Torre and Weyland, highlight a Manichean 
discourse that is present in populist rhetoric.24 This discourse portrays the situation in 
black and white terms– and in particular, a struggle between good and evil.  In the 1944 
Ecuadorian elections Velasco defined “el pueblo” in political and moral-transcendental 
terms, linking them to heroism and patriotism, in contrast to “el oligarquía,” who had no 
conscience or interest in the common good.25  Castro frequently talks about the well-
being of the people.  He often preaches against the threat of imperialism, the United 
States, the Cuban traitors (dissenters), and others who seek to destroy their sovereignty 
and way of life.   
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For obvious reasons, it becomes particularly advantageous for a populist to be 
seen as one of the people.  In doing so, the populist is also able to present himself as a 
political outsider, who can rightly criticize the establishment.26  Vargas was able to 
recreate his image for his second presidential run by painting himself as a laid-back 
cowboy who drank traditional yerbe mate tea on his ranch, only to reluctantly return to 
politics at the behest of his supporters.27 
The idea that “the people know best” leads to the profession of democracy while 
often ignoring its institutionalized practice, revealing one of the reasons for the main 
criticism of the populist tradition.  Upholding this ideal serves to legitimate the populist’s 
actions.  Because the supporters stand by their leader, and are often active in the decision-
making process itself, his actions are therefore justified in any situation. The infallible 
nature of “the people”, in turn, creates an “anything goes” attitude which can be used 
negatively, like for example, in violating minority rights in favour of the majority.28  
According to De la Torre, in defense of undemocratic actions, Velasco believed that 
“…he, the leader, the national embodiment, was certainly above ‘bad’ Constitutions, 
‘corrupt’ politicians, and ‘ignorant or misled’ citizens whose antagonistic opinions had to 
be silenced.”29 Kirk Hawkins argues that this democratic discourse, focusing on the 
popular will, is always present in populist cases.30   
A top-down style of governance and low levels of institutionalization unite 
populist leaders of old and new.  Populists usually take steps to secure their position, 
building power around them, while systematically breaking down political institutions 
that would restrict their power.  Kenneth Roberts states that populists commonly employ 
deinstitutionalization and “the politics of antipolitics.”31  It is argued that because Perón’s 
party-union linkages were so weak, built upon informal agreements and tradition, it was 
easily dismantled during the “neoliberal age” of the 1980s and 90s, which in turn allowed 
Menem to broaden his class appeal, outside of the diminishing status of organized 
workers.32  Castro totally dismantled the power structures of the U.S. puppet government 
of Cuba when his 1959 Revolution succeeded.  In this case, he did institutionalize a 
totally new system.  Constitutional reform is also a common way to shift the balance of 
power between the president and legislature.33  For these reasons, populism often has an 
ambiguous relationship with democracy. 
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As I have shown, political populism has several characteristics that have persisted 
throughout the twentieth century. The remaining characteristic concerns economic 
practice.  Further analysis of historic cases of populism continues to support the 
affirmation of a resurgence of populism in the 1990s to present, despite some scholars’ 
claims that “populism is dead.”34  Given different circumstances and time, many new 
leaders have dismissed the old developmentalist (or “structuralist”) economic model and 
adopted the economics of neoliberalism.  This change has prompted renewed discussion 
over what characteristics are tantamount to the definition of populism.  Academics who 
consider economic policy a determining factor, like myself, disagree with the assertion by 
some scholars that recent neoliberal leaders like Peru’s Alberto Fujimori and Argentina’s 
Carlos Menem can be rightly classified as populist, alongside those classic examples of 
the earlier age like Perón, Vargas, and Velasco.   
Economics, then, becomes quite significant in reaching any measure of consensus 
about the nature of Populism.  The tension between the political and economical 
emphasis in the populist definition has led to a proposed compromise by differentiating 
between the new and old variants of the phenomenon.  The construction of the categories 
of “classical populism” and “neopopulism” has been used to distinguish the two types 
throughout Latin America.  In these classifications, the basic tenets of populism hold true 
–like David Leaman’s basic criteria of a multi-class following led by a leader possessing 
personalistic style and rhetoric35- but the boundaries are not restricted solely to the 
political realm.  It is more than simply a matter of when these leaders arose, but how they 
chose to deal with the political and economic conditions of their countries.  Nonetheless, 
the debate is on-going. 
Traditionally, populists practiced the model of import substitution 
industrialization (ISI) and state intervention.  Early twentieth century populists favored 
economic policies of redistribution, increased social spending, and national development, 
principles frequently overlapping with socialism. Because of their overall rejection of 
market-oriented reform, many economists view populists as “fiscally irresponsible” who 
used frivolous spending to acquire public support.  These kinds of economic preferences, 
held by populists of the 1930s and 40s, contrast sharply with conventional wisdom of 
today. 
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Neoliberalism, in recent years, was hailed as the only means to pull Latin 
America, and other underdeveloped nations, out of economic stagnation and poverty.  
Many scholars argue that political populism and economic liberalism cannot co-exist.  
Because political populism depends on the active support of a heterogeneous group of 
supporters, the populist leader needs to appease them in concrete ways, i.e. via wealth 
redistribution through social programs, and favorable policies, like protectionism, 
subsidies, and entrepreneurial incentives.  The neoliberal model flies in the face of the old 
developmentalist economics favored by the classic populists of the 1930s and 40s.  
Neoliberalism welcomes foreign investors and ownership of industry.  It advocates 
minimal involvement of the state in economic matters, upholding an extreme adherence 
to the “laissez faire, laissez passer” capitalist ideology.  Government spending is reduced, 
and inherited debt often requires governments to adopt structural adjustment programs 
advocated by international financial institutions like the IMF (International Monetary 
Fund) and the World Bank.36  Essentially, the state disappears from the economic and 
fiscal stage, losing most of its influence over economic and fiscal policy-making.  
Certainly these changes create a major dilemma for a populist leader, who 
typically increases his powers in all arenas.  Neoliberalism effectively ties the hands of 
the president, relieving him of many important responsibilities and opportunities.  How, 
then, do some argue for the populist status of leaders like Fujimori, Menem, and others 
who have adopted the economics of neoliberalism?  
These so-called “neopopulists” clearly exhibit certain populist qualities.  I will 
focus on Menem and Fujimori, who most often receive this label.  Though neither was 
known for their charisma, they were both admired for different aspects of their 
memorable personal style.37  Both took steps to deinstitutionalize existing political 
structures and ruled in a centralized, presidentialist manner.38  They received political 
endorsement from a multi-class grouping and developed a discourse that categorized “us 
and them.”  Their ideology and political agenda were vague in their respective electoral 
campaigns. 
Fujimori and Menem both rose to power on a populist campaign with professed 
intentions to implement developmentalist-style economic policies.  Menem ran with the 
Perónist Party, which held tightly to the lasting impact of Juan Perón on the populace.  
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However, once in power in 1989, he abandoned Perónist economic values.  Fujimori was 
elected in 1990 in Peru, a country where the populist tradition is also very strong.  He ran 
against the incumbent populist Alain Garcia and neoliberal author Mario Vargas Llosa, 
and then shocked everyone by making an about-face change from his campaign promises 
to adopt a stabilization program that was even tougher than that advocated by his neo-
liberal opponent.39   
Is this simply a case of “bait and switch” tactics, a term used by historian Paul 
Drake to describe leaders who used populist-style politics to get elected, only to return to 
“normal” methods of governance?40  The answer depends on one’s criteria for an 
accurate assessment of Populism.  Many scholars, like historian Jorge Basurto, find 
neoliberal economics and political populism to be “antithetical to each other”41, and 
therefore a leader pursuing such policies is not a true populist.  A primarily political 
definition, however, endorses such cases.  Proponents of this view suggest that Menem 
and Fujimori cast doubt on the supposed incompatibility of political populism and 
economic liberalism.  Kenneth Roberts (1996) and Kurt Weyland (1999) argue that 
political populism and economic liberalism are, in fact, compatible.  According to 
Roberts, autocratic neoliberalism may in fact embody the core political and sociological 
elements of populism.42 
 One argument for the credibility of neopopulism is that both populists and 
neoliberalism are used as a remedy, an apparent solution, to a country’s economic or 
political stagnation.  Populists typically gain popularity because they are able to convince 
their supporters that they can deliver them from the present chaos – that is why a crisis 
situation is the most conducive for the rise of populism.  Weyland argues that 
“prepackaged neoliberal programs are ready-made recipes to combat the economic crisis 
and show off their ‘extraordinary’ abilities to ‘save’ the country.”43  For example, 
Menem promised a “salariazo” (huge wage increase) and a “productive revolution” 
(through no specified means) and the initial economic improvements achieved by his
neoliberal package, he argued, did just that.  In this way, he defended his policies, 
suggesting that it was not a “great turnaround” (in policy promises) as critics had 
charged.
 
44  Also, it is argued that neoliberalism does not necessarily mean an end to 
social responsibility.  Neopopulists, and neoliberal economists, may still use 
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redistributive principles.  Fujimori used spending in this way.  In the 1996 federal bu
40% of the total government budget was directed to social spending, all of which was 
directed through the ministry of the preside
dget, 
nt, not traditional ministries.45   
I disagree.  It is not possible to separate the political and economic realm so 
dramatically. To speak the language of populism, appeal to the typical populist support-
base, and to rule in the said “populist” fashion, rightly demands economic policies that 
affirm the political position taken.  A leader must “practice what he/she preaches”; 
economic policies must be a noteworthy factor in the populist definition.  Much more can 
be said on this debate, but that is not the purpose of this project.  Nevertheless, an 
understanding of the neopopulism argument is important in correctly classifying Chávez.  
Chávez presents a strong case for the viability of populism in the twenty-first 
century.  In many ways, he fills the criteria spectacularly.  First, anyone who has seen 
video footage of Chávez can immediately sense the charismatic and personalistic element 
of his political image.  Chávez is, simply put, a “fun guy.”  He loves to laugh, joke, and 
sing.  He interacts with his supporters, as well as with other international leaders, in a 
personal, intimate way – hugging, cheering, and joking with them.  His supporters tell of 
their admiration of him as a brother and a neighbour, as one of their own.  
Chávez’s image is also paternalistic in nature, with him as leader acting on behalf 
of ‘his people.’  Not only does Chávez seem to genuinely care about the people and take 
the time to interact with them, but he also attempts to address their needs in tangible 
ways.  This paternalistic, and even messianic element is clear in the faith of the people 
who appeal to Chávez as the answer to their problems. Venezuelans call in to Chávez’s 
“Aló Presidente” program with concerns quite far from the realm of politics.  One lucid 
example is a man who spoke of the problems caused by his broken bicycle, to which 
Chávez sympathized and instructed the caller where to take his bicycle for a free repair.46  
This is a common occurrence; Chávez regularly meets with his supporters, listens to their 
problems, and promises (and often time, delivers) a solution.  As well, frequent religious 
language and metaphors in his speech contribute to his messianic image. The assertion 
that “God is on our side” further cements the approval of his loyal supporters.  The 
religiosity of Chávez’s discourse is significant, like many populists of the past.  
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Where Perón, Vargas, and Ibarra used balconies and podiums to address the 
people, Chávez, though not abandoning these fora, can now easily reach a broader 
audience through the technology of television broadcasting.  Television is an ideal 
medium because it conveys more personality and charisma than radio or print.  As Silvio 
Waisbord, a professor of journalism, points out, “Personalism” works well with “media 
logic,” because it prioritizes and focuses on individuals, rather than ideas.47  The key 
elements of Chávez’s style, his radicalism, personable casual appeal, and use of history in 
rhetoric, are all favourably exhibited through this medium.  To be sure, Chávez’s intimate 
relation with the public is, in part, due to many hours of media broadcasting. From his 
live interactive “Aló Presidente” to the frequent televised public addresses, Chávez uses 
the media heavily in connecting with the Venezuelan people.  Waisbord argues that an 
unintelligent media is best suited to a populist’s success.  In “Media Populism: 
Neopopulism in Latin America,” he says, “By definition, [the media in Latin America] 
bows to popular tastes and rejects elitist culture outright.  Programming telenovels 
throughout the day, Latin American television continually celebrates popular 
sensibilities, language, and miseries.  With its steady diet of talk shows, tabloid news, and 
variety shows that feature ‘everyman’ and ‘everywoman’, television is the ultimate 
populist medium.”48  There is truth to this statement in regard to the content of modern 
programming in Latin American countries.  Presently, the Latin American media is 
characterized by light programming, filled with soap operas, games shows, and celebrity 
profiles.  However, my objection to Waisbord’s statement is with the underlying 
presumption that “the people” targeted by populist leaders are ignorant and exploited 
people, who absent-mindedly consume all popular culture without desiring anything 
more substantial.  This view reflects yet another negative belief about populism - that the 
populist following are mesmerized and deceived by the charismatic persuasive leader.  
This contention not only undermines the intelligence of millions who have supported 
populists throughout history, but is also quite simply untrue.  As I will explain in 
subsequent chapters, the content of Chávez’s message, whether exported through the 
media or other methods, is contrary to the ‘mindless’, unstimulating substance of today’s 
media.   
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Secondly, populism typically generates a heterogeneous, multi-class political 
coalition.  Historically, the workers have made up the bulk of support for populist 
leaders.  In recent cases, like Castro and Chávez, the support-base has changed.  Chávez’s 
support is concentrated in the low levels of society.  Throughout his presidency, Chávez 
has seen a rise and fall in his support among the other classes. While the classical 
examples of Perón and Vargas reaped support among the working class, Chávez has not 
aligned with the working class and labour unions.  In fact, the Confederation of 
Venezuelan Workers (CTV) and Chávez have had a combative relationship from the 
beginning.  Several policies enacted by Chávez have contributed to this, as well as CTV’s 
traditional ties to the Democratic Action (AD), Chávez’s main political opposition.49  
This difference in class appeal can also be explained by the changing nature of 
society.  The globalized market economy, dominated by big businesses and multinational 
companies, has led many more people to enter the informal economic sector; those 
‘unorganized’ informal workers are often much more numerous than the organized 
working class.50  The informal sector now accounts for nearly 50% of urban employment 
in Latin America.51  Chávez has sought to incorporate these atomized groups, the very 
poor and the indigenous, into the political fabric of the nation.   
Outside of the allegiance of the poor, Chávez also enjoys key support from the 
military.  As a former army colonel, his first inroads in gathering a following were among 
colleagues who shared his distaste for the Carlos Andrés Peréz government.  However, in 
Andrés Peréz’s first years as president, several high-ranking officers, upset by loss of 
privileges from the regime change, allied with the opposition and helped carry out the 
April 2002 coup, which temporarily removed him from power.  When Chávez returned, 
he used this insubordination to his benefit and discharged much of the military high 
command, leaving in place those loyal to him.  
As stated earlier, mobilization of supporters is a common characteristic of 
populism.  However, today, public life has changed from the so-called ‘heyday’ of 
classical populism in the 1930s and 40s.  Politics are not generally conducted in the 
public spaces like the streets and plazas anymore, but in official places or in the media.52  
The routine nature of public mobilization in Venezuela, then, is all the more significant.  
These gatherings take place at both Chávez’s behest and the people’s own initiative.  
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Chavistas have mobilized on many occasions through countless demonstrations in the 
streets, elections and referendums, and participation in social development programs and 
military reserve training.   
Commentary on Chávez, especially in the early period, was highly speculative in 
part due to his vague ideological position.  Journalists and government officials alike 
came to varied conclusions about the Venezuelan leader based on his vague rhetoric and 
ever-changing opinions.  Chávez’s speech often includes use of grand notions - ideas like 
revolution and imperialism - which can be interpreted in various ways.  For instance, the 
proclamation of his belief in ‘socialism’ is frequent; yet in practice, his regime differs 
from traditional ‘socialism’.  (For example, private ownership and entrepreneurship is 
allowed and encouraged, as well as foreign investment, although there are signs this 
might change in his third term.) Chávez’s movement is called “Bolivarian”, an imprecise 
concept, drawing on popular reverence for revolutionary leader, Simón Bolívar. Like 
other populists, Chávez has also spoken of a “third way”, an alternative to the traditional 
political dichotomy of socialism and conservatism.  
His discourse focuses on “el pueblo.”  “The people” represent, for Chávez, the 
common people, those who have been underrepresented, ignored, and exploited.  The 
adversary, then, is the elite and the political establishment, virtually one in the same in 
Venezuela due to decades of backroom dealing and corruption.  The term used most often 
by Chávez is “the oligarchy,” also common to the populist experience in history.  In this 
globalized age, the enemy also includes foreign powers in the business and political 
world.  The “imperialists” play a very important role in Chávez’s politics because of his 
strong objection to neoliberalism and capitalism.  
In the 1998 elections, Chávez effectively portrayed himself as a political outsider 
and candidate against the establishment.  Chávez often points to his Indigenous and 
African heritage as added legitimacy to his claim of likeness to the people, and at the 
same time to distance himself from the “rotten” elite.  
Manichean discourse permeates Chávez’s politics as well. Chávez certainly 
presents the issues in antithetical terms, with ‘the people’ embodying the ultimate good 
while almost any action taken by the Venezuelan oligarchy or the U.S. government is 
‘bad’ or ‘evil.’ Chávez has even referred to President G.W. Bush as “Mr. Danger”, 
 31
“Satan”, and “the devil”. Chávez often incites the people over the dangers of the 
“hovering predators” who circle, waiting for an opportunity to descend.  The threat of 
these groups, be they the United States, the international financial institutions, or the 
Venezuelan upper class, is used to unite the people and generate greater support for 
Chávez’s nationalistic program.   
One of the most frequent criticisms of Chávez is how he has centralized power 
around himself, leading some to cry authoritarianism and dictatorship.  The 2002 coup 
and the subsequent general strike “legitimized’ dismissals and appointments throughout 
the government, the military, and the national oil company, Pdvsa.  Specific legislation 
has helped Chávez amass power; in late 2001, Chávez bypassed the National Assembly 
to push through forty-nine “enabling laws.” Additionally, critics have pointed to changes 
in the Supreme Court as further damaging democratic structures.  
The deinstitutionalization of formal political structures is also present in Chávez’s 
case. The failure of the Venezuelan political system opened the doors for sweeping 
reform.  Many structures of the old parliamentary system, which was dominated by two 
highly entrenched political parties, were dismantled by Chávez and his newly formed 
MVR.  The Movimiento Quinto Republica (Fifth Republic Movement) remains a loose 
coalition of several small parties53 who have come together around the charismatic 
leadership and vision of Chávez.54  The degree of personalism in the party structure is 
obvious.  As Kirk Hawkins points out, the fact that supporters and opponents use the term 
“Chavistas” or “antiChavistas” rather than “Emeverrista” (based on the party name, 
MVR) demonstrates the focus on the leader rather than the party.55 Every electoral 
campaign focuses on the personage of Chávez, with his picture plastered on everything as 
endorsement for party candidates.   
The new Venezuelan constitution of 1999 reinforced the power of the Executive 
(for example, it allows the president to dissolve the National Assembly upon presidential 
decree) and extended the length of the presidential term from four to six years, which 
further contributed to “a state of hyperpresidentialism.” It also reversed changes made by 
previous leaders to decentralize power.56 A presidentialist system, like that under 
Chávez, argues Kurt Weyland, is much more conducive to populist leadership, as 
opposed to a parliamentary system.57 
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 Roberts argues that populist figures that do not pose a major threat to the elite, 
(which are few, if you reject the neopopulist distinction) especially in terms of economic 
reform, do not need to build extensive organizations.  Chávez, however, has formidable 
adversaries, and thus requires a political counterweight to the entrenched structures of the 
political system.58  Therefore, Chávez has sought alternative ways to access political 
support.  Instead of strengthening or institutionalizing his party,59 Chávez focused on 
structural changes to the political system.  The MVR remained “in a permanent state of 
electoral mobilization” according to Roberts,60 because of the many elections and 
referendums conducted. These actions further weaken traditional methods and institutions 
while strengthening new organization among Chávez’s allies.  As Chávez’s rhetoric and 
policy increasingly distanced political and economic elites, grass-roots organizations 
were developed.  In 2000, the “Bolivarian Circles” were created.61  Existing at all levels, 
municipal, regional, and national, these Circles are very important in educating the 
public, delivering social services, and mobilizing political action.  Instead of bringing 
these groups into the national political network, they remain separate and independent of 
the MVR party.62   Many other community groups have surfaced, with and without the 
persuasion of Chávez. Land councils, called the Urban Land Committees (CTUs), are one 
such organization, which assist families in securing legal titles for property in the barrios.   
The argument that Chávez is a return to classical populism is especially strong 
when considering the economic policies taken by his Bolivarian government. While the 
new string of ‘neopopulists’ have consistently adopted neoliberalism as their economic 
program of choice, Chávez has adamantly rejected it.  
At the beginning, Chávez acted prudently in fiscal matters, taking steps to regain 
economic sovereignty of key industries, but mostly concerning himself with political 
issues, like the rewriting of the Constitution, as well as disaster relief in Vargas after 
massive flooding and mudslides.  In a 2005 interview, Chávez told Aleida Guevara 
March that, “in the first two years, we were on the defensive.”63  Chávez’s caution comes 
through in this early postulation about his economic agenda; former head of the Central 
Bank, Ruth de Krivoy, told the Wall Street Journal that Chávez’s economic policies “do 
not reflect a total commitment to market-oriented policies or a complete rejection.”64 
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 Over the years, however, Chávez’s economic policies have taken a dramatic turn 
to a more radical posture, rejecting neoliberalism, which in the eyes of many economists 
is considered the only model for any measure of economic success.   Undoubtedly the 
lessons learned by previous experiments under the governments of Carlos Andrés Peréz, 
and Rafael Caldera, influenced Chávez’s economic beliefs.  Economic policies 
implemented under Chávez, with the stated aim of helping the poor and 
underrepresented, resemble classical populism, with the focus on state intervention and 
the development of industry and social programs. 
Dramatic increases in oil revenue helped Chávez pay for a more interventionist 
position. Venezuela’s oil sector contributes 25% of the total GDP and, therefore, the 
country’s economic stability is highly dependent on its operation.65  The oil company, 
Pdvsa (Petroleos de Venezuela) was brought under federal ownership in 1976 under 
President Carlos Andrés Peréz but successive governments relinquished much of this 
control.  Andrés Peréz’s opening up of the industry (“the apertura”) in his second 
presidency (1989-93) essentially reversed his earlier decision to nationalize Pdvsa, and 
opened it up to foreign investors and reduced taxation as an added incentive.  However 
even before this, Pdvsa had become a “state within a state”, virtually autonomous and 
unaccountable to the government.66  Under Chávez, Venezuela regained the majority of 
shares in the company.67 Chávez has also increased the amount of royalties paid by 
international partners and is partially credited for increasing the price of oil because of his 
leadership role in restoring the power of OPEC.68  Particularly after the April coup and 
the subsequent strike and lockout, which lasted three months (December to February) and 
devastated the Venezuelan economy, dramatic restructuring of Pdvsa’s executive has 
given Chávez extensive power over Venezuela’s most valuable resource.  Other natural 
resources have been nationalized, such as the mining industry, and several agro-industrial 
businesses (supplying state products like milk and maize flour.)69  These resources, but 
principally oil, have truly been the source of Chávez’s empowerment, allowing the 
creation of many redistributive and social equity programs.  The Constitution states that, 
“any revenues generated by exploiting underground wealth and minerals shall be used to 
finance real productive investment, education, and health.” This provision prevents oil 
profits from going to enterprises outside the country, as it had in the past.70  
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 The redistributive objective is seen in the many social programs initiated by 
Chávez’s government.  The health care system has undergone tremendous expansion, 
bringing needed services to remote locations and poor areas.  Free education has been 
made widely available throughout the country, for all levels and ages.  Mission Mercal, 
which continues to grow, offers discounted goods at its retail-food chain stores.  Besides 
the humanitarian focus, the government argues that these investments in health, and other 
social areas, will have a direct positive effect on the economy.71  
 The new Constitution also expresses the classically populist trait to assist the 
public in their financial and economic well-being.  Article 313 states; “the taxation 
system shall seek a fair distribution of public burdens in accordance with the taxpayer’s 
ability to pay, taking into account the principle of progressive taxation, as well as 
protection of the national economy and raising the standard of living of the 
population…”72  
In the business sector, small and diverse forms of entrepreneurship have been 
promoted.  “Social production companies” have been created alongside traditional 
capitalist forms.   These new companies, now an estimated 67,000, are based around 
“cooperatives.”73  According to the official government site, “The Cooperative, as 
opposed to the anonymous companies, is a company of people, not of capitals… [that] 
promotes democratic management and elimination of capitalist benefit”.74  Companies, 
run under “worker’s co-management schemes”, allow the community to be involved in 
decision-making. As well, Venezuelan craft and folk industries have been encouraged 
with the legalization of the informal sector.  According to Chávez, the people have the 
right to their livelihood – whether it be in official stores or in the markets on the street.75   
 Monetary policies have been implemented to combat the state of economic crisis 
that Chávez inherited.  In February 2003, Venezuela switched from a floating exchange 
rate to a fixed one, in reaction to threats of capital flight and drastic devaluation of the 
bolívar due to a banking crisis and general economic depression (further aggravated by 
the 2002 strike.)76  
 By spurning the pressures of international financial institutions and powerful first 
world countries, Chávez has presented a clear alternative to the powerful paradigm of 
neoliberal capitalism.  Chávez has set out to prove that this is a viable option, and one not 
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solely for countries blessed with the luxury of large oil reserves.   Venezuela’s example, 
coupled with the promotion of regional cooperation and integration, has encouraged 
others to question the supposed superiority of free-market economics.  What remains to 
be seen is whether Chávez’s model, like that of populists from the earlier period, is 
sustainable.  Chávez must prove that this macroeconomic redistributive model does not 
continue the pattern of Latin America’s economic history, in which the populist 
experience ends in economic collapse. 
Presently, other leaders who resemble Chávez are gaining ground.  Populism 
seems to be experiencing a revival. Evo Morales, though in the very early period of his 
presidency, can be said to have populist qualities.  His rhetoric and policies closely 
resemble his friend and ally, Chávez.  He purports to represent “the people”, mostly the 
Indigenous, in Bolivia, and defend them against foreign exploitation in the form of 
privatization and foreign domination of their natural gas reserves.  He also pledges to 
protect coca farming.  Luis Ignácio Lula da Silva has been called populist.  The 
classification carried more weight early in Lula’s career, as he campaigned across the 
country in peasant clothing, exhibiting a down-to-earth appeal, and criticizing the 
inefficiency and corruption of Brazil’s political elite.  However, Lula worked quite 
closely and cooperatively with the political elite through existing institutions, and has, for 
the most part, discarded populist discourse.   Leaders like Lula and Morales possess 
populist attributes, just as Menem and Fujimori, but should not be promptly labeled 
populists without further examination.  
The fluidity of the populist concept, though at times frustrating, is perhaps one of 
its strengths.  The need to neatly fit any historical figure or a political movement into an 
ordered and familiar box is somewhat unrealistic, and in a sense devalues their heritage.  
Carlos de la Torre remarks, “Maybe because of their ambiguities, these notions allow 
social scientists to research these phenomena in all of their complexities.  Populism, old 
and new, has resisted efforts to find clearer models that in their effort to be parsimonious 
leave out immeasurable elements of politics such as identities, discourses, and the 
meaning of these experiences for actors.”77  Therefore, I too, accept the vague notions of 
populism.  Chávez is a complex figure, one that represents both great optimism for the 
future, and fosters great suspicion.  Thus, understanding Chávez and contemporary 
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Venezuelan politics requires careful consideration. Nonetheless, in both political style 
and economic policies, Chávez aligns strongly with the key elements of the populist 
definition, and represents a remarkable revival of what many scholars said to be “dead.”  
In speech and practice, he has revolutionized contemporary Latin American politics 
under the historic banner of populism.  
I will conclude with Chávez’s opinion on the subject.  Being painted with the 
populist brush carries certain negative connotations, like economic irresponsibility, 
autocratic rule, and political manipulation of the “blind” masses, so it is no surprise that 
Chávez would reject the populist label.   In a 2004 interview with Marta Harnecker, 
Chávez says “… our attitude is not that of those governments that went to a town with a 
bag of bills, giving away money, or walking around with a bag of food – that, yes, was 
populism.  I am against that… [Our support] is a result of direct contact with the people, 
who, as you have seen, do not remain only to receive handouts.”78  Despite the negative 
implications of this label, the example of Chávez is proof that populism, in its classical 
and ‘true’ form, is alive and well in Latin America in the 21st century. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
HUGO CHÁVEZ’S RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS VENEZUELAN SUPPORTERS 
 
 Chávez’s success is largely due to the loyal support he receives from Venezuela’s 
poor and traditionally underrepresented sectors of society.  Though Chávez initially 
enjoyed support from a wider class base, his radical posture caused various leaders and 
political groups, as well as some of the middle class to gradually withdraw their support, 
leaving the poor majority as the bedrock of support for Chávez and his revolution.  Both 
the increasing allegiance among the poor and marginalized, and the alienation of sectors 
of the middle class are a result of Chávez’s explicit appeal, both in the form of policy and 
style, to those sectors of society traditionally marginalized.   This chapter will examine 
Chávez’s relationship with his Venezuelan supporters, and demonstrate how further 
analysis of Chávez’s style reinforces his classification as populist. 
 Chávez’s support among the poor is well-known.  Chávez’s rhetoric and policy 
are clearly aimed at the poor, and in effect often offend the upper classes.  Pro-Chávez 
demonstrations and political events generally take place in the poorer neighbourhoods of 
Caracas as opposed to oppositional rallies held in wealthier areas.  Election results also 
show strongholds of support in more impoverished areas of the country.  A 2003 poll 
elucidates this point further, showing that the poor and the very poor, which make up 
80% of Venezuela’s voting population, were twice as likely to vote for Chávez than the 
middle and upper class.1 Also, a poll preceding the December 2006 presidential election 
revealed deep political divisions along class lines; it showed that 68% of those voting for 
Chávez were direct beneficiaries, or knew someone who was, to the Missions, the social 
programs developed by the Chávez government.2  The poor indeed play an integral role 
in Chávez politics. 
 These supporters are crucial to Chávez’s political sustenance.  Frequent 
plebiscites (especially in the first year of his presidency) repeatedly called upon the 
people to defend various reforms and policies, and to decide upon the fate of the 
president himself.  A clause added in the 1999 Constitution provides recourse for 
removing an unpopular official from any level of government.  In June 2004, the 
opposition gathered the sufficient number of signatures to put a recall referendum into 
process.3 On August 15, 2004, almost ten million voters came out to decide whether 
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Chávez should indeed be recalled; 60% of those voting said “No”, indicating that Chávez 
should fulfill his mandate.4  
 Massive demonstrations have typified the years of Chávez’s leadership; chanting, 
banner waving, and sometimes violence occur during protests and rallies for both sides of 
the political terrain.  As mentioned earlier, on April 11, 2002, a coup d’etat was carried 
out in Palacio Miraflores, the Venezuelan parliamentary building, occurring 
simultaneously with two of these standard marches. Chávez and top government officials 
were captured by a coalition of upper-level military officers, leaders from the 
oppositional parties, and Fedecámaras (the business federation), who then proclaimed 
power via a defacto government.  The loyal members of the Chávez camp managed to get 
word to his supporters that a coup had been staged, and that, despite media claims to the 
contrary, Chávez had not surrendered.  As the news spread, passionate Chavistas took to 
the streets to demand the reinstatement of the president.  With Venezuela at the brink of 
civil war, the opposition conceded defeat and Chávez was returned to power.   
The mobilization of Chávez’s supporters is imperative to his staying power as the 
country’s president. The spirited response of “el pueblo” to defend Chávez is due to the 
relationship fostered between them.  This chapter will discuss the motifs that characterize 
Chávez’s style and image, using primary sources like Aló Presidente, presidential 
addresses and publications, television footage, interviews.  Government reports and 
newspapers articles are also analyzed. There are three main factors that secure this 
allegiance from poor, lower class Venezuelans: Chávez’s radicalism; his personable, 
casual rapport; and his use of historical references. 
Chávez’s style inspires and excites the Venezuelan people.  (As will be seen, 
public addresses are far from a dull passive viewing by the audience.)  Certainly a 
prominent characteristic of Chávez’s style is the sensationalism and provocative tone of 
his rhetoric.  Denouncing President Bush and proclaiming to usher in “socialism of the 
21st century” are notable examples.  Emotional appeals, often with religious overtones 
and rhetorical adeptness, are evident and important in Chávez’s appeal.  As demonstrated 
earlier, these qualities are shared among the classical populists of Latin American history.  
The case of Chávez differs, however, when analyzing the substance of his speech.  
Chávez extends the stylistic models and tropes of classical populism to provide content 
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that is not mind-numbing, but encourages supporters to question structures and embrace 
change. The central focus of Chávez’s discourse is to educate and politicize Venezuelan 
(and international) audiences. 
Venezuelans were clearly frustrated with the previous government and the 
decadent political system in place.  Like so many Latin American countries, positions of 
prestige in Venezuela were normally reserved only for the white upper class.  Chávez 
represented a complete break from the past.  The radicalism of his image and political 
campaign was very alluring as was the fact that Chávez is of a mixed blood and poor 
origin. The media makes this fact visible.  More importantly, Chávez identifies himself as 
mestizo.   
  Chávez’s background as a military officer evokes wariness and suspicion.  This 
may not seem particularly “radical” when considering the many military dictatorships of 
recent Latin American history.  (The dark sunglasses and menacing image of Chile’s 
General Augusto Pinochet likely comes to mind.)  In much of Latin America the military 
has been associated with a repressive elite and a military career has become a means to  
elevate one’s status.  However, in Venezuela, the military is characterized by middle and 
lower class makeup, and has remained separate from politics for decades.  Under Chávez, 
the military has come to symbolize opposition to Venezuela’s traditionally elite-
dominated politics. By frequenting donning his military uniform and beret in public 
appearances, Chávez draws attention to this break from the military’s traditional role.5   
Chávez’s opponents point to his close alliance with the military as dangerous, objecting 
to several appointments of military officers to government positions and other military 
involvement in civilian affairs.6   As well, numerous cases of alleged human rights 
abuses in Venezuela, such as police brutality and threats to human rights workers, f
contribute to the view of Chávez as a military strongman or dictator.
urther 
7 
Apart from personal character and background, Chávez’s radicalism is evident in 
his confrontational style, inflammatory language, and the controversial content of his 
agenda.  In concrete terms, Chávez’s plans mean dramatic alterations for Venezuela. The 
creation of a new Constitution was a central issue of Chávez’s political platform in the 
1998 elections.  Once elected, Chávez was called to swear upon the Constitution during 
his inaugural ceremonies.  He often retells the story of his distress caused by this 
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moment; as a way to complete the ceremonies yet still show his disdain for the system 
itself, Chávez’s oath was as follows: “I swear before this waning constitution that I will 
do everything in my power to give our people a true Magna Carta worthy of their 
dreams.”8  Shortly afterwards, as one of his first presidential acts, steps were taken to 
initiate this project.  A referendum was held in July 1999 seeking permission to draft a 
new Constitution, and in December of that same year, the final draft was passed.9  The 
creation of a new constitution not only symbolized a new future for Venezuela, but 
opened avenues to effect change.  Among the many changes, longer presidential terms, 
expanded executive power, and a transition from a bi-cameral to a uni-cameral legislature 
were enacted.10 
Chávez has likened the 1999 Constitution to the Popol Vuh – in reference to the 
sacred Mayan text, meaning “Book of the Community.”11  This should not be considered 
a mere attempt to draw connection with the great indigenous heritage of the Mayans, but 
is representative of the new inclusive form of politics intended by the document.  
Pocketsize copies of the Constitution are sold on practically every street corner 
throughout Venezuela.  Chávez frequently uses the document to argue the legality of and 
public approval for the policies and actions of his government. 
 Many changes have been made to the social structure of the country.  Falling 
under the broad slogan of “the Bolívarian Missions,” a series of newly established social 
welfare and education programs cater to the needs of the poor.  Mission Barrio Adentro, 
one of the most prominent and successful programs, brings free Medicare services to 
poor communities through the assistance of several thousand Cuban doctors. Various 
levels of educational services are provided through the Missions Sucre, Ribas, and 
Robinson, which range from a basic alphabetization program to university level courses.  
Basic subsistence needs are met through Mission Habitat, which offers construction of 
low-cost housing for the poor, and Mission Mercal, through markets that sell food and 
consumer goods at discounted prices.  All of these programs and more represent the 
radical restructuring of Venezuela under Chávez’s rule.12  
Likewise, land reform has also been a priority.  The Land Act of December 2001 
has since distributed over 5.5 million acres of government land to small peasant 
cooperatives.  The government has also repatriated several large holdings, which were 
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underdeveloped or unused, following a new decree passed last year.13  Mission Zamora, 
one of the many Bolívarian missions, oversees land distribution and “the eradication of 
the latifundio.”14  Progress in urban land reform is also significant; over 84,000 titles 
have been given out to 126,000 families living in the poverty-stricken and crowded 
“barrios” through grass-roots organizations called Urban Land Committees established in 
February 2002.15 
 Venezuela’s Indigenous people are particularly vulnerable to exploitation and 
poverty.  Most live in remote areas spread across Venezuela’s diverse terrain of 
Amazonian rainforest, grassland plains (“los llanos”), and the mountainous Andes.  
Chávez has taken a keen interest in the state of these people, both socially and culturally.  
He recognizes the importance of preserving Indigenous tradition and culture, and has 
made several advances in this area.  In the New Constitution of 1999, the rights to 
political, social, and cultural organization were codified.  “The Book” itself has been 
translated and published in all of Venezuela’s indigenous languages.  Mission 
Guaicaipuro was launched in October of 2003 to ensure Indigenous people understand 
their rights.  One of its foci has been on land claims.  Indigenous peoples have been 
granted 6,800 km² of lands in communal titles since its creation.16  Additionally, in a 
symbolic move, “Columbus Day” has been renamed “Indigenous Rights Day” in honour 
of the historical struggle of Indians in the early contact period.  Chávez attributes his 
sympathy for the plight of the Venezuelan Indigenous peoples to his own indigenous 
ancestry.  In an interview he stated, “…. I feel the Caribbean stirring within me, because I 
am Indian, mixed with African, with a touch of white thrown in.”17   
 The media has been a significant tool in informing the Venezuelan public of the 
progress made in political and social issues. These developments have been highly 
publicized by government agencies, and mentioned frequently by Chávez.  Although 
scholar Silvio Waisbord considers television to be “the ultimate populist medium”18 due 
to its ability to convey charisma and personal appeal, it has also served another purpose 
for Chavez.   
Chávez’s populism, in fact, is contingent upon the education and empowerment of 
the Venezuelan people.  Without it, Chávez could not hope to ‘revolutionize’ an entire 
country.  For this reason, literacy and education Missions have been promoted so 
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strongly.  The Constitution is sold by every street vendor and community courses are 
offered to explain its content so that all Venezuelans can fully understand their rights.  
Frequent public announcements by the government, and the opportunity to phone-in to 
“Aló Presidente” also serve educational purposes. 
To further this educative goal, the Chávez government has created or promoted 
several new means of communication, in order to combat the aggressive upper-class 
media, and the adverse effects of globalization and commercialism on the media’s 
content. Chávez revamped the national network to offer more programming and 
additional channels.  Internet resources have also been expanded.  The creation of 
Telesur, a South American television network, has also been instrumental in providing a 
different perspective on regional events. The mandatory broadcast of ‘important’ 
government announcements is another effort to restore the responsibility of public service 
to the media. The media, therefore, is valuable to the Bolivarian movement, both in terms 
of conveying Chávez’s unique style and exporting its substantial message.   
 Chávez’s political style is also radically different from past Venezuelan leaders 
because of his apparent honesty and openness with the public.  Through the media, he is 
able to speak to his supporters in a more intimate setting. In an unguarded and forward 
manner, Chávez voices his opinions on many different topics.  Chávez professes a great 
love of learning and reading. He is constantly exploring his own ideas and is the first to 
admit that he is always growing and changing, which implicitly encourages his 
supporters to do likewise. Added to this are Chávez’s perceived open, honest character 
and his talkative nature.  Thus, over the years, this process of “figuring himself out” and 
his exploration of different political values and ideologies are quite openly documented 
through early speeches and interviews.  
 His views on democracy are one example.  In the formative years between the 
1992 coup and the 1998 election, Chávez did not hold the system of democracy in high 
regard.  He stated in an early interview that liberal democracy19 and its paradigm was 
rightly coming to an end.20  In justifying this position, he explained that one cannot take a 
foreign-made system and simply apply it to a very different culture and people, which he 
considered to be the case with Venezuela’s democratic experience.  “Democracy is like a 
rotten mango…What we have to do is get its seeds and take care to make a new 
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plant…that can grow in a different Venezuela.”21  In today’s context, where the social 
reality is far from equal, Chávez believes that this type of democracy creates a political 
elite based on who controls the wealth.  Yet clearly Chávez later came to a new opinion 
of this political ideology, arriving at an acceptance of its principles and abilities. Chávez 
believes in participatory democracy (as opposed to liberal democracy), which strives to 
include every citizen in the decision-making process.  Testament to this is that Chávez 
chose the electoral path, and put aside violent means, to generate change in Venezuela.  
Also, in the first two years of his presidency Chávez clearly demonstrated his respect for 
the democratic process by holding two referendums and three elections.22  In every action 
taken by him and his Bolívarian government, Chávez defends himself by pointing to the 
democratic nature of his policies.  He also, begrudgingly at times, contends that 
honouring democratic codes are not always the easiest or most efficient means to carry 
out change, especially considering the polarized political environment in Venezuela. In a 
2005 interview, he said, “We are obliged to respect laws that are very often contradictory 
to, or put the brakes on, the revolutionary process itself. That is a heavy burden for us to 
bear.”23   
 Changes of opinion such as this make Chávez’s movement sometimes difficult to 
understand.  It is easy to be confused about Chávez’s true opinions.  Under a veil of 
rhetoric and faced with altered and contradictory expressions over time, interpreting 
Chávez can at times be difficult.  In the case of democracy, he has come full circle in his 
position.  Another example is his changing views on socialism. There was a time when 
Chávez freely categorized his movement as socialist, but he now seems to be distancing 
himself from older recognized forms of socialism, including Castro’s.  Chávez asserts 
that he is not Marxist, or Communist, but recently describes himself as simply 
“Bolívarian”, a unique construct that speaks to the development of a “third way,” 
historically common to populist-style leadership.  However, he has continued to call his 
movement socialist. In a conference early in 2006, Chávez said, we must, “transform the 
mode of capital and move towards socialism, towards a new socialism that must be 
constructed every day.”24    These modifications in political thought make it easy for his 
opponents to criticize him.  They are able to pick and choose references from his many 
public speeches or published works.  As well, they sometimes point to these 
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inconsistencies as claims that he is not fit to rule, or that he is “crazy.” For these reasons, 
Chávez’s unorthodox and open style has alarmed some people.  These same qualities, 
however, have helped secure immense support from the poor and underrepresented 
classes of Venezuela. 
A second aspect of Chávez’s political style is his innate ability to touch people in 
a personal and intimate way.  This ability is often cited by common Venezuelans as the 
reason for their political backing of Chávez.  Patricia Marquez’s interviews with the 
Venezuelan poor highlight this sentiment.  A few typical responses were: “I like how he 
speaks because it comes from the heart.”  “He tells the truth.” “Chávez is a good man. He 
is helping all of us.”  “Before him, all we had were promises. All the stuff was for those 
high-up there, not for us in the barrios.”25   They feel that Chávez talks directly to them, 
and is devoted to improving their lives.   
Chávez not only interacts with the public in a very personable way, he also makes 
it a priority to nurture this relationship.  Never before have the poor of Venezuela had a 
politician take such notice of them, let alone treat them as equals.  Chávez is often 
documented in video and photos socializing with the crowds of people at any of his 
numerous public appearances. He embraces his supporters and calls them either by name 
or by the endearing term “hermano/a”, meaning brother or sister.  He also joins them in 
song in the streets.26  
 Chávez speaks to the people as one of his own; his speech is not heavily laden 
with formalities and bewildering language. One survey in Caracas found that 62% of 
those interviewed liked his speech “very much.”27  One Venezuelan scholar argues that 
Chávez’s simple, traditional message in the 1998 presidential campaign, in contrast to the 
flashy posters and expensive television shows of his adversaries, contributed to his 1998 
electoral success.28   
Chávez’s speeches include a degree of humility, ardency, and flattery.  Chávez 
regularly asserts that he is not anyone special, but just like them.  He is part of a “nation 
of dreamers”29, who are convinced that some day justice can be achieved for all 
Venezuelans.  He has declared that the years of injustice and thievery on the part of the 
government must be stopped and the people must reclaim what is rightfully theirs.  Yet 
beyond his assertion that he is ordinary, he confidently rises to the role he has been given 
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in the Venezuelan struggle.  His fervent commitment to end disparity and inequality 
arouses and encourages his many supporters. “Every year that is left in my life I dedicate 
completely to the fight of the Venezuelan people, whom I love more than my own life.”30  
Though it is downplayed, a sense of messianic authority is not lost on Chávez or his 
followers. “I’m obliged to fight for the weakest. To struggle, from my soul, for the poor 
and the most needy. That’s why I’m here.”31  
Chávez constantly compliments common Venezuelans who, he says, inspire this 
struggle.  He credits the military officers for their work in the Vargas flood tragedy of 
December 1999 and returning him safely after his capture in April 2002.  He praises the 
people for their stamina and perseverance in the face of adversity, their faith and trust in 
the Bolívarian project, and their commitment and patriotism.  He calls them “warrior 
people”32 with great love and strength, frequently applauding the virtues of Venezuelans.  
Chávez’s regular contact with the Venezuelan people is conducted through 
recurrent interviews, television broadcasts, and informal gatherings.  However, the most 
successful and innovative method of communication is his weekly interactive radio 
program.  “Aló Presidente” provides an opportunity for direct contact with normal 
Venezuelans by allowing them to phone in their questions, criticisms, and comments for 
their president.  Chávez’s performance in these programs exemplifies an unusual style.  
Through four hours of conversation, Chávez demonstrates both stamina and an ability for 
spontaneous creativity matched only by Cuban President Fidel Castro.  Chávez has ample 
opportunity to converse about many topics, topics not always relevant to political affairs.  
The show features conversation with adoring followers interspersed with soliloquies from 
the chief executive on topics such as the joys of having a girlfriend and ‘the revolutionary 
process in the universities.’”33  The sometimes strange subject matter of his program 
allows his supporters to feel that they finally have a president that they can relate to and 
understand.   
In formal public appearances, the energy and responsiveness of the crowd is 
overwhelming. A formidable union is clearly present between the audience and its 
speaker.  Public rallies are less like a political presentation than a commander rallying his 
troops or a coach giving a pre-game speech.  For example, this address given to a Caracas 
crowd is typical:  As Chávez walks to the podium, the crowd enthusiastically shouts 
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“Viva!” or “Chávez no se va!” (Chávez will not go!) with loud cheering and applause.  
Chávez later ends his talk by sending a “Bolívarian hug, a revolutionary hug” and a “see 
you later.”34 Similar speeches involve song and cheers echoed back and forth. 
Another important element of Chávez’s relationship with “the people” is his use 
of history to connect with the common experiences of his supporters.  He himself is an 
avid reader of many different forms of literature, and has done substantial writing of his 
own.35   He recalls being enthralled from a very early age by stories of the War of 
Independence told to him by his grandmother.  Chávez argues that history has great 
power to educate and generate understanding for future development.  He says the goal of 
history is for a people “to know themselves, to know where they come from, their 
historical process, the evolution of their history….History is not just an epic. History is 
the history of their culture, how it was formed, how do we have this color, why is it 
called Venezuela, what has been the process that has made us what we are today.”36 His 
speeches are peppered with historical examples used to provide explanations for present 
circumstances.  He also argues that the forces of history are greater than any individual 
person.  “As leader,” Chávez says, “I am partly a prisoner of history itself, of historical 
consequences.”37  We all have a role to play in the historical process, he asserts, but we 
are also simply one piece of a much larger picture.  
 Chávez’s personal fascination and appreciation for history combined with his 
oratorical abilities result in frequent mention of historical figures and events in public 
speeches and interviews.  This has become an important technique in arousing his 
followers, as they relate to familiar illustrations in an intimate way.  Chávez also 
possesses a remarkable ability to manipulate historical images to fit his agenda.  This 
appropriation of history is very effective. 
Simón Bolívar is the principal symbol for Chávez’s political movement. Chávez’s 
initial movement, a loosely defined assemblage of young military officers, was called 
MBR-200 (Bolívarian Revolutionary Movement 200.)  The name of his official political 
party was changed to the Fifth Republic Movement because existing restrictions prohibit 
the use of Bolívar’s name for political organizations; however, the historical implications 
are preserved in the acronym MVR which produces the same pronunciation as its 
predecessor.38  The most obvious tribute to Bolívar is the legal change of the country’s 
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name to incorporate reference to the revolutionary leader: The Bolívarian Republic of 
Venezuela.   
 Bolívar is an icon of immense proportions. “El Liberador”, from Caracas, is 
revered by many in a number of South American countries for his leadership in the 
nineteenth century revolutionary wars against Spanish colonialism. Venezuela has a long-
standing adoration for their hero; literally every town has a “Plaza Bolívar” as the central 
gathering place, the national currency is called “Bolívares,” and Caracas in particular is 
home to endless heritage sites and museums to commemorate him.   
 Chávez mentions Bolívar constantly, whether it be quoting the leader’s teachings 
or drawing upon historic examples from Bolívar’s life.  The following speech given at the 
Urban Land Title Ceremony in Caracas, January 11, 2003 is typical:  Chávez argued, 
“Bolívar once said, ‘Justice is the queen of all republican virtues.’”  Chávez then asserted 
that Venezuela desires peace, and Christ himself said that peace is only possible with 
justice. He continued, “Bolívar lived and died for peace, but he was betrayed by the 
oligarchy and left humiliated, expelled, alone to die.  But now Bolívar’s dream is alive, 
alive in the streets of La Vega, in the Venezuelan people, ‘This is Bolívar!’”39  The 
crowd replied with enthusiastic cheers and applause. 
The tremendous respect for Bolívar confers instant endorsement for all activities 
associated with his name.  As one scholar writes, “The Bolívarian cloak has cleverly 
rendered Chávez’s actions unquestionable in the eyes of Venezuela’s poor masses and the 
middle class.  At the same time, it turns his critics into not just political opponents, but 
unpatriotic naysayers suspected of serving non-nationalist interests.”40 In an interview, 
Chávez described his opposition as “a small privileged sector [who] do not have respect 
for the country.  They do not have any kind of Venezuelan pride or sense of 
nationality.”41 He was then asked to comment on why some intellectuals who had once 
supported him are now his opponents.  Chávez answered that everyone has the right to 
their opinion, “But I follow Bolívar who said, ‘Before the claims of those who believe 
that they are wise, I prefer the advice of the people.’ The people are indeed wise.”42  
This is certainly not the first time that a leader has evoked the image of Bolívar as 
a means to gain the popular support of the populace. Nonetheless, Bolívarian rhetoric has 
grown exponentially under Chávez, all with specific purpose.  According to historian 
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Richard Gott, Chávez’s use of Bolívar is not merely a way of generating national pride.  
“This is not an exercise in mindless nationalism,” he said, “[Chávez’s] purpose is not just 
to venerate a figure to whom most of his predecessors have only paid lip service, but also 
to rescue the historical character and achievements of the Liberator from the accretions of 
myth and fable.”43  
 The most fitting use of Bolívar as an emblem for Chávez’s movement is Bolívar’s 
struggle to end colonialism and all forms of foreign domination. The struggle to ‘liberate’ 
Venezuela again has led to the implementation of many programs aiming to address the 
social imbalance and reform international relations and economic principles. Secondly, 
Bolívar represents the dream of a South American confederacy and the goal to establish 
unity among Southern nations in order to advance their place in the world. 
 Bolívar, however, was a contradictory figure. The message of Bolívar can be 
interpreted in many different ways, which is one reason why Chávez is constantly 
defining what “Bolívarianismo” is.   In Venezuela, where reverence for Bolívar is strong, 
he has been called everything from an environmentalist, an anti-imperialist, and even a 
feminist.44  Chávez, too, recognizes the versatility of Bolívar’s personage as a symbol.  
As he has argued, “Bolívar is not just a man, Bolívar is a concept.  More than just a 
theory, Bolívar is a complex set of ideas related to politics, society, and justice.”45  
 On the surface, Bolívar certainly is a suitable and powerful banner for Chávez’s 
political movement, however, with numerous discrepancies.  First, for all of Chávez’s 
verbal attacks against the vile and corrupt elite, Bolívar was essentially one of these.  He 
was the only son of aristocratic parents who died early in his life leaving him their 
affluent estate.  Bolívar spent most of his early adulthood traveling Europe and the 
United States with his various tutors.  He was certainly not “of poor peasant stock,”46 to 
which Chávez lays claim.   
 Though Bolívar hailed the virtues of freedom and autonomy, he was, initially at 
least, very exclusive and elitist in his vision for a sovereign Venezuela.  Bolívar’s 
Revolution is in stark contrast to Chávez’s Bolívarian movement, which is primarily 
focused on the betterment of the lower classes.  In Venezuela’s first attempt at 
succession, Bolívar recruited only among the middle to upper classes, not allowing the 
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poor or the slaves to participate.  As it happened, Bolívar was forced to reconsider when 
his forces failed.47   
 Additionally, Bolívar and Chávez also differ in their views regarding the 
military’s function.  Since Chávez’s election as president, the military has become 
increasingly involved in political affairs, through political appointments and government-
sponsored programs, much to the alarm of many. Chávez considers this military-civilian 
alliance to be essential. In contrast, Bolívar was utterly opposed to military interference 
in any way.48  Usually these incongruencies are simply ignored, but at times Chávez has 
dismissed them as evidence of Bolívar’s human character, making errors as we all do. 
Chávez has also resuscitated other heroic revolutionary leaders into the country’s  
historical memory. Ezequial Zamora, José Feliz Ribas, and Antonio José de Sucre have 
joined Bolívar in Chávez’s regeneration of the “glory days” of Venezuela’s past. Felix 
Ribas and José de Sucre, along with Bolívar’s tutor, Simón Rodríguez, have Mission 
programs named in their honour.  Chávez has specifically used Ribas as an example to 
motivate the youth.  In 1814, Ribas won a decisive battle against the Royalists with very 
inexperienced troops made up mostly of young students.49 Because of that battle, 
Venezuela celebrates a national holiday called “Youth Day.”  Zamora has a personal 
appeal for Chávez due to his great grandfather’s participation in Zamora’s troops.  In 
campaigning for the 1999 referendum to create a new constitution, Chávez spoke to a 
crowd about Zamora’s historic battle of Santa Inés in which he positioned the “no” voters 
as Zamora’s opponents and the “yes” camp as the valiant winners.50   
 Simón Rodríguez, a tutor who helped mold Bolívar’s intellectual development, 
has also received attention from Chávez.  Rodriguez impressed upon Bolívar the 
uniqueness of the Latin American experience.  In 1828, in an early piece of writing, 
Rodriguez wrote: “Spanish America is an original construct.  Its instructions and its 
government must be original as well, as so too must be the methods used to construct 
them both.  Either we shall invent, or we shall wander around and make mistakes.”51  
This instruction had a profound impact on Bolívar, and over a century later, has 
influenced Chávez as well.   This “invent or err” idea has been quoted several times by 
Chávez for various purposes, in explanation of political beliefs, concepts behind 
proposed social programs, and in seeking appeal for international project initiatives.52  
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 Aside from Venezuela’s homegrown heroes, Chávez has also drawn upon other 
widely known historical figures.   One individual frequently raised by Chávez is Ernesto 
‘Che’ Guevara.  Informally known as “Che” (meaning friend), Guevara is internationally 
celebrated for his bravery and commitment to social justice and liberty, and venerated for 
his dedication to revolution.  Given Chávez’s admiration of Cuba and its experience, it is 
quite natural that he would speak of Che in relation to his own revolutionary struggle.  
During an Aló Presidente show, Chávez introduced Che’s daughter who was conducting 
a series of interviews with him.  He praised her father as “one of the greatest 
revolutionaries in the history of the Americas and the world” and one who was always 
loyal to his ideals. He also proceeded to call all of Cuba’s dedicated doctors working in 
the Barrio Adentro program “Che Guevara’s sons and daughters” standing “side by side 
with the Bolívarian people.”53  
 This admiration of Che existed from the beginning. For a time during his military 
career, Chávez gave lectures at a training college, where he was once called in by his 
superiors to explain just how a uniformed second lieutenant could be speaking about 
Bolívar and Che Guevara in the same breath.54  Although he responded very flippantly, 
Chávez surreptitiously approved of Che’s movement, despite being a military officer who 
would be expected to despise such guerilla tactics.   
 Even modern-day United States heroes may serve various political objectives for 
Chávez.  Chávez celebrated Martin Luther King Jr., the great civil-rights leader of the 
1950s and 60s, for his progress in achieving racial equality in the United States.  During 
2005’s anniversary of King’s “I Have a Dream” speech, Venezuelan public television 
aired a commemorative special on King’s humanitarian efforts, with subtle analogies to 
Chávez’s struggle for ethnic and social equality in Venezuela.55  Chávez has found a new 
friend in Reverend Jesse Jackson, a champion of African American rights; on one 
occasion Chávez invited him to co-host a session of Aló Presidente.  Jackson, in turn, 
praised Chávez’s work with indigenous rights and his offer of cheap oil for poor 
American citizens affected by the disaster of Hurricane Katrina.56  
 The Catholic Church commands considerable authority and respect among most 
Venezuelans.  Naturally this influence is reflected in the content of Chávez’s speech as 
well as his personal ideals and faith.  Chávez speaks out of the context of Latin American 
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liberation theology, an ideological movement that began in the 1960s propelling the 
belief that  Jesus Christ’s earthly message was to care for one’s brother, specifically 
focusing on the poor and the needy.  Liberation theologists envisioned a certain kind of 
community based on Jesus’ teaching and believed the Church was called to usher in these 
changes.   In this context, according to one scholar, “…values such as altruism, 
community, solidarity, and the redistribution of wealth are elevated over individualism, 
material success, competition and profit growth.”57 In an interview in September 2005, 
Chávez discussed the goals of his “revolution” and displayed clear agreement with these 
beliefs.  He said, “One of the greatest rebels, who I really admire, is Christ.  He was a 
rebel.  He ended up being crucified.  He was a great rebel.  He rebelled against the 
established power that subjugated.  That is what rebellion is: it is rebellion out of love for 
human beings.  In truth, that is the cause, the cause of love: love for every human being, 
for every woman, for every child, for every brother.”58  
 Chávez confidently proclaims God’s favour for his movement, which focuses on 
the plight of the poor; “This is God’s fight; God, the redeemer of the people, whom 
today, 2002 years after his birth, is more alive than ever.  Long live Christ, the savior of 
the people, forever!”59   In a 2003 speech, he even quoted scripture, Romans 8:31, 
saying, “If God is with us, who can be against us?”60 Chávez has also occasionally 
confronted the Catholic Church in Venezuela for their lack of cooperation in this very 
“pious” struggle.  His personal beliefs, however, are not overly clear.  He outwardly 
proclaims himself a faithful Catholic.  His religious sentiment is also somewhat eccentric
or at least altered, by this humanist statement: “God, for me, is the people.”
, 
 
 into popular support. 
61  Regardless
of his alignment with accepted Catholic beliefs, Chávez plainly uses the historical figure 
of Jesus to propel his movement forward.  As seen with all of these historical references, 
Chávez possesses an acute understanding of public sentiment and how it can be 
cultivated
The poor Venezuelan majority who support Chávez are extremely important for 
his political viability.   Both the message and the mode are critical pieces of Chávez’s 
appeal.  Informative content, which champions basic human and citizens’ rights, is 
essential to Chávez’s plan for Venezuela.  His style, radical yet familiar to the common 
people, has made Chávez’s profound message more palatable.  The effects of this are 
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evident.  Social organization at the grassroots level has multiplied in previous years.  
Political participation, whether in rallies or official parties, has also grown.  Education 
and literacy has improved through the Mission programs.  There is also a growing 
movement of community radio in Venezuela, which seeks to restore integrity and 
diversity to the media.62  
Chávez’s political style and public image have been successful, based on his 
sizeable support-base and numerous advances in achieving policy objectives. The 
carefully cultivated mutual relationship of admiration and trust between Chávez and his 
followers originated early on and has remained a high priority, as Chávez continues to 
reshape Venezuela in accordance with his Bolivarian vision. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
HUGO CHÁVEZ’S DIPLOMACY IN THE LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNITY 
 
Central to the Bolivarian vision is Latin American unification and solidarity. The 
amalgamation of the territories of Columbia, Venezuela, and Ecuador immediately 
following the end of Spanish colonialism attest to this.  “Gran Columbia” clearly 
demonstrates Simón Bolívar’s idealist reverie for the whole of Latin America.  Chávez 
adapted this desire into a more versatile form, envisioning a modern coalition of sorts, 
perhaps resembling the European Union.  Chávez pushes for stronger ties within the 
sovereign Latin American community, through political collaboration, economic 
cooperation, and an emphasis on overall social progress.  As Teo Ballvé stated in The 
NACLA Report, “Chávez understands regional integration, bloc-building, and South-
South solidarity as vehicles for attaining national sovereignty amid coercive U.S. 
power.”1  Chávez does not in any way see this unification as detracting from the 
independence of these nations.  On the contrary, this coalition would result in greater 
authority and sovereignty over one’s affairs, by providing the necessary distance from 
U.S. influence and encroachment.   
Chávez has adopted the same tools and utilized the same political style in 
pursuing these Latin American-wide goals as he did in building support within 
Venezuela.  This chapter affirms Chávez’s populist character through emphasis of the 
populist characteristics in his diplomacy with the Latin American community.  There are 
three main elements that characterize Chávez’s pursuit for stronger relations among Latin 
American countries.  Chávez’s radicalism in image and policy encourages relationship 
with potential allies of similar background and mentality.  A personable approach to 
diplomacy, in part due to Chávez’s character, and in part a conscious attempt to win over 
potential allies, has led to new and strengthened partnerships.  Also, the use of history is a 
tool for unification, which commonly appears in Chávez’s rhetoric, particularly 
‘demonizing’ the U.S. to convince others of the need for a ‘united front.’ In these ways, 
Chávez strives to create favourable conditions to spread Bolivarian ideals.   
 The solid relationships that have developed with regional leaders have been 
imperative to the success of Chávez, but could not be achieved without the practical 
incentive of trade and business at the heart of negotiation.  Chávez’s greatest strength in 
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securing closer relations lies in the leverage of oil.  In attempting to increase solidarity, 
this commodity has been instrumental. Even before Chávez was elected he understood 
the power of petroleum.  "Oil is a geopolitical weapon," he declared, "and these imbeciles 
who govern us don't realize the power they have, as an oil-producing country."2  In a 
2005 interview, Chávez cited Venezuela’s energy alliance with Cuba as an example of 
how "we use oil in our war against neoliberalism.”3 As seen in diplomatic actions since 
his rise to presidency, this asset has been thoroughly expended.  Oil has been at the 
forefront of all international relations.   The newly established corporations, PetroSur, 
PetroCaribe, and PetroAndina, attest to the fruit of this labour.   
 Petrocaribe was established between fourteen Caribbean countries in June of 
2004.  At a meeting in Montego Bay, Jamaica, on September 7, 2005 these agreements 
were deepened with Venezuela committing to supply 77,300 barrels of crude and refined 
products per day to each country with a two-year grace period for payment at a 2% 
interest rate.  Other terms were established, such as covering the rise if oil prices went up, 
and allowance to pay part in goods.4  This provision was used by Cuba for example, 
whose fiscal capital is small but who instead offered its expertise in the medical field.  
Some 12,000 Cuban doctors are now employed in Venezuela to run Mission Barrio 
Adentro, one of the many social programs introduced by Chávez, which brings free 
healthcare to poor neighborhoods and villages.5  Thirteen of the fifteen Caribbean nations 
have signed on to Venezuela’s oil initiative.6  Chávez is trying to extend the triumph of 
the PetroCaribe model into South America, where his diplomacy is more focused.   Oil 
agreements have so far been reached with Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Argentina, with others currently in development.  PetroSur agreements would integrate 
regional oil and gas industries in a strategic manner and further increase the importance 
of Venezuela in the region.  
All of these oil alliances are part of Chávez’s ambitious dream of PetroAmerica.  
As Chávez told Marta Harnecker in an interview, “The five countries liberated by Bolívar 
are energy rich: they have gas and oil” so it is natural that they should work together, and 
then “why not include Mexico?” in order to create “a sort of OPEC right here in the 
region.”7  PetroAmerica, a continent-wide energy company, would benefit regional 
development and economic stability by allowing them to bargain collectively with the 
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U.S.   Just as oil has been used as a “weapon”, Venezuela’s power of oil is also used as a 
bridge for South American nation-building.  Responding to a new oil deal with Ecuador 
in August 2005, NACLA editor Teo Ballvé forecast: “If things go this easily for Chávez 
in the coming years, he will rule the Andes with an oil fist. He will succeed with oil 
where Bolívar failed with armies to unite the Andes.”8  
Of course, oil is not the only matter of business between Venezuela and 
neighbouring countries.  Deals have been made by Venezuela to buy ships from 
Argentina, oil tankers from Brazil, and coca and other agricultural products from Bolivia.  
To facilitate such trade agreements, Chávez has a dream of ALBA, whose acronym 
means Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas, in an attempt to counter what he 
considers the “wretched” Free Trade Area of the Americas.  
Chávez rejects the FTAA.  According to Chávez, the FTAA, a design proposed by 
the United States, is “a colonial, imperialist plan”9 which only exploits and abuses the 
people of Latin America.  The neoliberal FTAA would “liberalize” trade between 
countries through elimination of subsidies, tariffs, and other barriers that prohibit 
exchange.  As appealing as this language sounds, in reality, according to Chávez, “free 
trade” favours first world nations who have the financial and technological means to 
dominate the market.  Therefore, while promising equality, Chávez argues that this 
systems breeds inequality; and for this reason it is rejected outright by Chávez.  Chávez’s 
understanding of the FTAA also explains his oppositions to the ‘western’ view of 
democracy.  Just as neoliberalism ‘equalizes’ all nations in the economic markets, liberal 
democracy ‘equalizes’ individuals in a political state.  Chávez believes that the FTAA, 
and the broader construct of free market capitalism, would not benefit the country, or 
even the majority therein, but merely a small group of elites.10 
Instead, Chávez offers an alternative system.  ALBA is a model of trade that, 
according to one sympathetic newspaper, is “grounded in the principles of 
complementarity (rather than competition), solidarity (instead of domination), 
cooperation (not exploitation), and respect of sovereignty (instead of corporate rule).”11 
The Venezuelan bank, Bancoex, summarizes ALBA’s main objectives in language 
heavily influenced by Chávez’s speeches on the topic:  “[ALBA] advocates a socially-
oriented trade block [and] …a reinvigorated sense of solidarity with the underdeveloped 
 64
countries of the western hemisphere, so that with the required assistance they can enter 
into trade negotiations on more favourable terms than have been the case under the 
dictates of developed countries.”12  Only Castro and Morales have officially signed-on to 
ALBA, deeming it, in true populist form, “the People’s Trade Agreement.”  Nonetheless, 
much appreciated support comes from Lula and Kirchner who have also rejected the 
FTAA and pushed for more integration and regional trade.  
In December 2005, Venezuela joined the Latin American trading bloc, 
Mercosur,13 which if strengthened, could also play a major role in economic integration.  
At the G-15 Summit of March 2004, among many of Latin America’s political leaders, 
Chávez encouraged more action in this area: “Why not advance the system of trade 
preferences among developing countries that only exists symbolically, whereas the 
protectionism of the North expels our countries from the markets?  Why not promote 
compensation trade and investment flows within the South instead of competing in a 
suicidal fashion among us, offering concessions to the multinationals of the North?”14  
His speech continued with ways to promote regional integration.   
Many joint projects and investments have also been made. Recently, Brazil, 
Argentina, and Venezuela have committed to a very ambitious program of building a 
10,000-mile transnational gas pipeline through the three countries, costing an estimated 
$20 billion over the next ten years.  Venezuela is building an oil pipeline with Colombia 
to reach the Pacific.  Also, in December 2005, Venezuela bought $1 billion of 
Argentina’s debt, in order to shift its obligation from the U.S. to Venezuela and the 
southern bloc. 
Outside of trade, several other ideas have been put forth by Chávez.  In September 
2005, Chávez moved all of its foreign currency reserves to Europe due to “threats” from 
the United States.  On several occasions Chávez has proposed that the leaders consider 
establishing a South American development bank where they would deposit some of their 
reserves and which would also provide advantageous conditions for social and economic 
investment projects.  Chávez said that Venezuela would be willing to give an initial 
deposit of five billion dollars to set the project into motion.  This bank might later 
become a world bank, challenging the dominance of financial institutions like the IMF 
and World Bank.  “It is a stupidity that a majority of our international reserves are in 
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banks of the North,” said Chávez to the gathered leaders in Brasilia October 7, 2005, for 
a Summit of the South American leaders.15  He also spoke about the idea of a common 
currency (like the Euro.)16  These suggestions are presented as practicable and realistic 
ways to reduce dependency on the United States, and strengthen regional ties, which 
Chávez argues is essential to maintaining true sovereignty. 
In addition, Chávez has also recognized the benefit of sharing culture and 
knowledge.  In July 2005, Telesur was launched, a South American media network 
established by Chávez’s initiative.  This network is intended to present issues of regional 
and cultural significance, as opposed to the monopoly of the Western media in both news 
and entertainment. At the ceremony, Chávez spoke about the importance of sharing 
knowledge: “A conscience of who we are is vital,” a vital element in establishing 
solidarity among the Latin American nations.17  Programs that focus on regional interests 
would contribute to heightened awareness of cultural distinctiveness and pride, a crucial 
aspect to achieving Bolivarian goals.  
Although Chávez is sometimes criticized for undermining existing programs to 
create his own, he is in favour of reviving and developing some of the many institutions 
that already exist, but have simply been neglected or deemed a failure.  In an interview 
with Harnecker, Chávez listed several of these and speculated as to why projects such as 
CEPAL (Latin American Economic Commission), ALADI (Association for Latin 
American Integration), and SELA (Latin American Economic System) have failed. 
“There are institutions,” he said, “that have elaborate integration proposals that could go 
over really well.  Neoliberalism did almost all of them in.”18 In August 2006, in a letter to 
the South American presidents, Chávez proposed a commission to examine various 
issues, like resource sharing and community development.  He reminded them, “We are 
not starting from scratch.  We have a wealth of experience and knowledge that we should 
share.”19  All of these policies, those instituted and those merely proposed, demonstrate 
the cooperative approach that Chávez considers so valuable to the improvement of Latin 
American affairs. 
By urging a stronger commitment to each other through policy proposals and 
programs, Chávez automatically, and purposefully criticizes the United States in 
attempting to convince Latin American leaders of the urgency of his argument.  Anti-
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Americanism is one of the defining features of Chávez's speech.  Not surprisingly then, 
Venezuelan-United States relations are strained.  Criticisms from both government 
administrations’ have been frequently and increasingly hostile towards each other.  As G. 
W. Bush and Condoleezza Rice question Chávez’s intentions and deem Venezuela a 
“destabilizing force” in Latin American, Chávez has accused the United States of 
conspiring with his political opponents in Venezuela to remove his government.20 
There are many ways in which Chávez provokes the United States.  First, Chávez 
has pursued relationships with so-called misfit nations – Iraq, Iran, Russia, China, Syria, 
and Libya – all to Washington’s dismay. As a Petro-State president, and a founding 
member of OPEC, Chávez has been brought into close association with some of the U.S.’ 
greatest adversaries in the Middle East.  Likewise, Chávez’s efforts to make China a 
greater trading partner have also come under suspicion.  All of this aside, the relationship 
generating the most objection is undoubtedly Chávez’s relationship with Cuba. The 
historic fracture between the U.S. and Cuba came shortly after Castro’s nationalist 
revolution of 1959.  The U.S. has since gone to great lengths to ostracize Castro from 
world events and has pressured others to abstain from all relations with Chávez.  This 
pressure has failed with Chávez.  An early attempt by the U.S. to dictate the policies of 
Chávez's governance was firmly rebuffed when Chávez refused to cancel his visit to 
Cuba at Washington's request.21 This early incident exemplifies the distinct path that 
Chávez’s government would take, in contrast to a history of close adherence to the 
United States’ wishes.  Chávez continues to defy the U.S. by these relationships, in which 
he resolves to remain autonomous and free in his political and personal decisions.  Also, 
the shared mistrust and outright contempt for the United States constitute an important 
element of these relationships.  
  Chávez has used anti-American rhetoric to strengthen his standing throughout 
Latin America.  For some statesmen and citizens alike, Chávez’s aggressive attack on the 
United States government, and particularly on George W. Bush, while generally 
successful, has had some drawbacks.  Chávez brought his attack on the U.S. to a very 
public level at the September 15th, 2005 UN Summit in New York, criticizing the U.S. on 
numerous fronts.  The Washington Post reported on Chávez’s impact on those present:   
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U.N. experts and foreign envoys said Chávez, like Castro, was able to 
capitalize on a reservoir of resentment of American power in the world 
body.  "Obviously people are pleased with what he said, but they cannot 
express themselves as frankly as he does," said one Arab ambassador.  
Chávez's popularity also reflected the penchant of some U.N. members 
for rallying around political figures who face attack by conservative 
U.S. lawmakers. (He generated the most applause of any speeches). The 
applause for Chávez was recognition of the "sheer entertainment factor" 
of his undiplomatic speech, said Nancy Soderberg, a former senior U.S. 
diplomat at the United Nations. "Those speeches get so boring."  But 
Chávez would never be able to translate the popular reaction to his rant 
into political support for his positions because, while the moment 
"might be emotionally satisfying, [the delegates] know this is not the 
real world," said Jeffrey Laurenti, a seasoned U.N. analyst at the 
Century Foundation.”22 
 
Chávez, however, strongly believes that this support is real, and presents a 
different reason for why this sentiment is not more often conveyed.  In an interview with 
Cuban Aleida Guevara, Chávez said others feel the same way but are afraid to stand up 
against the U.S.  At the Summit of the Americas in Quebec in 2001, Venezuela stood 
alone in its opposition to the United States, but afterwards some presidents of smaller 
countries came to express support for what Chávez said.  When Chávez asked why they 
did not express this at the Summit, they answered, “we don’t have oil, we are tiny.”23  
Therefore, Chávez uses his boldness, combined with the security he has in oil, to stand up 
against “the bully of the block” and represent weaker voices.    
Recent events have added to Chávez’s repertoire of examples of U.S. 
encroachment. In August 2005, televangelist Pat Robertson caused a stir with his 
televised statement that the U.S. should have Chávez assassinated.  The lack of apology 
from the U.S. government, and its supposed support of Robertson’s statement, according 
to Chávez, has been mentioned incessantly by Chávez in public speeches and interviews. 
This followed a series of other incidents, all of which fueled the flame of Chávez's 
rhetoric.24  In the summer of 2005, Chávez repeatedly made direct accusations that the 
U.S. was behind attempts to assassinate him.  He announced, “If anything happens to me, 
the U.S. government is directly responsible.”25  Similar warnings came from Castro and 
Lula, and other public figures that urged calm in the escalating conflict.  By using these 
examples, Chávez generates fear and suspicion for the United States among his 
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countrymen and his Latin American counterparts, who see the evidence presented to 
them.  
Chávez’s distaste for the U.S. and their policies extends to other “imperial” 
countries and close allies of Washington.  However, an important fact to note is that 
Chávez’s scorn for imperial leaders does not include “the common people.”  Despite 
feuds and controversy with several heads of state, Chávez reached out to its citizens.  
Chávez recently lashed out against Tony Blair, calling him an “imperialist pawn”26 and a 
“main ally to Hitler” for supporting the U.S. war in Iraq, while continuing friendly visits 
all over Britain.27  In November 2005, he made harsh statements about Mexican 
President Vicente Fox, calling him a “lap dog of the empire”, which led to the withdrawa
of both their ambassadors.  Soon after, Chávez apologized to the Mexican people (n
President), offering love and friendship to his Mexican brethren, while donning a 
sombrero and singing Mexican folk songs.  Chávez’s suspicions of the United States do 
not inhibit his desire to help the poor in the US.  In a brilliant political move, in 
December 2005 Chávez offered cheap oil to poor communities in Chicago, Boston, and 
New York, bypassing national trade deals to reach municipal needs.
l 
ot the 
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 In his fierce anti-American rhetoric, Chávez uses history to justify his opposition to 
the U.S. and persuade other leaders of the need for increased solidarity.  Historical 
references frequent Chávez’s political discourse.  By presenting historic examples of 
struggles common to Latin American colleagues, and by quoting prominent leaders from 
the past and present which appear to endorse Chávez’s view, Chávez gains valuable 
credibility for his international agenda.  It is used to create a threat or danger in order to 
unite the peoples and leaders of Latin America.   Chávez’s use of history draws upon 
many of the major events in recent Latin American history.  An abundance of examples 
can be given, and indeed they have been by Chávez, to argue that the United States is a 
threat to the sovereignty of Latin American nations.  Chávez often refers to Bolívar and 
his wisdom in predicting the future problems that Latin America would have with the 
United States. Chávez has often spoken of “the Empire” as the cause of the people’s 
suffering and frequently quotes Bolívar’s letter in 1828 which states, “the U.S.A. seem 
predestined to plague America with misery in the name of liberty”29 
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Revolutionary hero, Símon Bolívar, is an obvious symbol for Chávez’s national 
agenda, but also very appropriate to his international objectives. Reverence for Bolívar 
exists throughout Latin America.  He was, after all, “the liberator” of Columbia, Ecuador, 
Bolivia, and Peru, not just Venezuela. Chávez’s homegrown supporters relish the 
mention of their national hero.  Also, in Brazil during the World Social Forum in January 
2005, the crowd welcomed Chávez with cheers and song about his taking up of Bolívar’s 
sword: “Ah, oh, Chávez is not going to go! Beware; Bolívar's sword is traveling through 
Latin America!"30  The memory of Bolívar is often evoked to inspire and unite Latin 
American leaders. In many speeches, Chávez praises the ideals of Bolívar, and reminds 
other leaders to honour his legacy.  At the UN Summit in September 2005, Chávez 
appealed to world leaders regarding Southern oppression, and recalled the ideals of 
Bolívar: “We are thirsty for peace and justice in order to survive as species.  Simón 
Bolívar, founding father of our country and guide of our revolution, swore to never allow 
his hands to be idle or his soul to rest until he had broken the shackles which bound us to 
the empire.”31 
Bolívar is also used to plead for cooperation in regional issues. Chávez wrote 
other Latin American leaders, saying, “Humbly, as one should always be, but also just as 
certain that in doing it we are responding to the challenge of unification that our 
Liberators left us, we hereby take up the words of Bolívar.  In his call for a Treaty of 
Perpetual union, league, and Confederation, he asked for a continent-wide, perpetual pact 
of faithful and unwavering friendship and of close and intimate union between each and 
every one of its Parties.  Such is the spirit that is voiced today by millions of South 
American compatriots.”32  Though Bolívar’s attempt to unite southern nations under one 
banner failed, Chávez builds upon Bolívar’s dream to inspire cooperation and mutual 
respect for one another. 
 The overthrow and death of Salvador Allende on September 11th, 1973 is perhaps 
the most effective warning against U.S. encroachment.  Chávez has taken the Allende 
story as a lesson for preparedness against U.S. military aggression in Venezuela.  He has 
stated that the Bolivarian Revolution is peaceful, but not unarmed.  He believes that it is 
essential for a people to be “capable, prepared, and armed for the integral defense of their 
country” because, if need be a violent confrontation would be necessary against 
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“dictatorial forces.”33  He has even quoted John F. Kennedy for validation, who said, 
“Those who make peaceful revolution impossible, make violent revolution inevitable.”34 
He has repeatedly stated his concurrence with Castro’s statement that, “If every labourer 
had been armed, the coup in Chile would never have happened.”35  On several occasions, 
Chávez has expressed interest in creating a Latin American military defense force, like a 
Latin American NATO.36 In an interview with Marta Harnecker, he suggested this, 
stating several examples throughout history where Latin America should have come 
together to prevent various abuses from occurring, incidents like the Argentina’s loss of 
the Falkland Islands to England, and the Santa Aliaza attack on Ecuador.  He believes 
that a united South should have prevented these travesties.37  
Neoliberalism is also a frequent topic in Chávez’s discourse, as seen in Chávez’s 
rejection of the FTAA.  Representing a set of economic and financial policies, the 
“Washington Consensus”, a phrase coined in 1990, has become synonymous with 
neoliberal free market capitalism.  International financial institutions, and the United 
States government, extolled the virtues of fiscal austerity, privatization, and market 
liberalism as the means to alleviate Latin America’s economic sorrows.  Neoliberalism is 
perceived to have failed in Latin America.38  In most cases, the result was  
extreme social polarization and inequality, further exacerbating class tensions.  Chávez is 
a leading opponent of this kind of economics. 
Chávez uses references from renowned figures ranging from religious officials to 
literary celebrities who have shared even a minimal level of agreement over the negative 
aspects of this worldview.  In a November 2001 speech to the United Nations, he said, 
“Go to the streets and the cities of Latin America and we will see the results of neoliberal 
politics, savage, as Pope John Paul II said.”39  In 2003 Chávez told those at an ALADI 
meeting in Uruguay that they needed to work together to make their own way because 
there is no future with U.S. and neoliberalism.  “I don’t think it’s possible to integrate in 
the framework of neoliberalism.  Neoliberalism is disintegrated.  It is contrary to the 
spirit of integration.  Its base is in individualism.  Its base is in competition, in elitism, in 
anti-democracy.”40  This assertion coincides with the shared political beliefs of the new 
leftism in Latin America, and has been used as a key reference for promoting ALBA and 
other regional projects. 
 71
Globalization is also a system scorned by Chávez.  In relation to his views on 
neoliberalism, Chávez objects to a kind of globalization which allows foreign powers to 
exploit a nation's people and resources, and which perpetuates inequality due to uneven 
access to the global market.  To express his distrust of globalism at the Fourth 
Hemispheric Conference Against the FTAA in Cuba, May 2005, Chávez quoted a famous 
Uruguayan writer, Ide Augustas, “Globalization is a mask,” he said, “a high-sounding 
term behind which crouches an evil intention, the old vice of colonialism.”  In the same 
address, he cited Eduardo Galeano, another Uruguayan, to warn of the deceptive 
promises of economic liberalism, and the injustices it perpetrates: “Never in history have 
so many been deceived by so few."41 
 Chávez’s diplomacy prioritizes the development of strong personal relationships 
with Latin American leaders.   Several visible new trends in Latin America’s political 
culture make these alliances quite natural.  Chávez’s ethnicity has political consequence.  
By self-identifying as mestizo, a person of mixed Indigenous, African, and European 
origin, Chávez represents a marginalized group that makes up approximately 70% of 
Venezuela’s population. Because of societal prejudice and institutionalized racism, many 
indigenous people hid their ethnic background in order to avoid stigmatization and 
designated social place.  Recently, however, indigenous peoples have embraced their 
culture and heritage more openly, and have begun to demand justice, such as improved 
social conditions and political rights.42  This affirmation of indigeniety and subsequent 
politicization is a very significant movement in Latin America, especially considering 
that there are some 55 million (or 10%) of people across the southern continent that fall 
into this ethnic category.  This newfound pride is an element of Chávez’s appeal, in 
which the people accepted Chávez as truly “one of their own.” 
 The recent politicization of Indigenous peoples also led to the election of the first 
Indigenous president in modern twentieth century Latin American history, Evo Morales 
of Bolivia.  Elected in January 2005, Morales, an Aymara Indian, shares a racial affinity 
with 55% of his populace.  He has promised to “change the course of history, which for 
five hundred years has meant injustice and inequality for Indigenous peoples.”43  Chávez 
immediately extended his political support and personal friendship to Morales; while 
attending his inauguration ceremony, Chávez commented that Morales was “an emissary 
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sent by God.”44 In a letter to Morales, congratulating him on his election, Chávez said 
that Bolivians have waited five hundred years to finally have an Aymara Indian as 
President and this represented, “a real and true historical vindication.”45 Chávez’s 
statements about Morales’ racial makeup accentuate his own claim to indigeniety, which 
not only carries weight in Venezuela, but throughout Latin America and the world. 
In addition to ethnic affinities, Chávez’s social background generates popular 
support.  The fact that Chávez arose from a lower-class background, in a region with little 
social mobility, has tremendous influence. In Venezuela, the poor have shown their 
determination in contesting upper-class dominance in political affairs, and since 1998, 
have become very involved through rallies and protests, exercising voting rights, and 
participation in grass-roots organization. The election of other presidents from the lower 
class reaffirms the growing consciousness of these sectors of society all over Latin 
America. 
Evo Morales, again, is a product of this trend. Morales first entered political life 
as a union organizer for coca farmers against the U.S.-led drug-eradication campaign.  
Once a coca-farmer himself, Morales is well accustomed to a life of labour and meager 
rewards.  In October 2002, the neighbouring country of Brazil elected Luiz Ignacio Lula 
da Silva.  One of eight children to poor parents, Lula knew well the poverty of Brazil’s 
city slums.  The former steel worker and shoeshine boy has a long list of credentials 
proving his working class heritage.46 His background as union organizer and founder of 
the socialist Worker’s Party aligns closely with Chávez’s socially-oriented Bolivarian 
Revolution.  
Chávez has commended Latin American people for empowering common people 
to rule, people who understand, and more importantly sympathize with, the reality of 
their countries, the first step to bringing justice to the region.  For example, on the recent 
reelection of Lula, Chávez said to a Venezuelan audience, “Let’s give Lula a round of 
applause.  We salute and congratulate Brazil’s people for this wise decision to re-elect 
this great brother, friend, socialist companion and labour leader.”47 By endorsing these 
leaders, Chávez again draws attention to his own background, and cleverly 
commemorates his own improbable rise while at the same time maintaining a humble and 
‘common place’ identity.  This triad of “under-class” presidents, Chávez, Morales, and 
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Lula, represents a clear break from the traditional political elite that has governed Latin 
America for centuries.  Their shared personal experiences make them natural allies, 
devoted to improving the substandard social conditions which they have experienced 
firsthand. 
Image aside, political values and proscribed ideology also play a role in uniting 
regional leaders. Latin America is currently undergoing a dramatic political 
transformation.  With a series of upcoming and recently held elections, many of the 
countries seem poised to adopt a leftist government, abruptly breaking from the neo-
liberal political tradition of the previous decades.  In country after country in Latin 
America, voters are choosing governments of the left.  Whereas, twenty years ago, Cuba 
was the only “red” spot of the American map, the present landscape now shows a 
majority of Latin American countries as “socialist” or “left-leaning.”  These leftist 
leaders, however, are very diverse in their ideological beliefs and political practice. The 
radical approach is represented by figures like Chávez, Fidel Castro, and Evo Morales, 
with their strong criticism of the United States and globalization.  These leaders favour 
dramatic governmental restructuring, as well as full or partial nationalization of 
industries. Adopting a more moderate posture are the so-called “ABC” countries of 
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile with presidents Néstor Kirchner, Luiz Ignacio Lula de Silva, 
and Michelle Bachelet, respectively, as well as Uruguay’s Tabaré Vasquez.  The 
moderates are generally determined to proceed with caution as not to ostracize possible 
upper-class support or scare off foreign investors.  (In fact, some analysts would 
altogether reject the categorization of Bachelet, or even Lula, as “leftist.”48)  One thing 
that is shared among them is a new focus on social development.  All declare a mutual 
desire to address class polarization and the plight of the poor.  Another common element 
is the push for greater sovereignty over their own affairs, which have led many to see the 
wisdom in strengthening regional economic and political ties.  These aspirations are 
fundamental to Chávez’s movement and, thus many potential allies can be found in these 
like-minded leaders. 
Chávez’s unique political style has greatly advanced Venezuela’s foreign 
relations, which is focused on these leftist regimes.  In a similar manner to the way 
Chávez has ‘befriended’ his Venezuelan supporters, he also extends a personal 
 74
relationship to his Latin American counterparts.  His relaxed and down-to-earth style, 
combined with humility and ardent efforts in diplomacy, have helped build advantageous 
relationships.  
Fidel Castro was one of the first Latin American leaders to welcome Chávez’s 
political arrival.  Historically speaking, Castro has been a symbol for an alternative type 
of governance and a defiant opposition to American hegemony.  Chávez’s early and open 
admiration for Castro influenced early projections about his leadership, with journalists 
and politicians alike immediately painting Chávez as a communist dictator in the making.  
Chávez’s contact with Castro is more than just a cordial relationship between two heads 
of state – in fact they have become close friends, much to Washington’s dismay.   
Chávez has publicly stated many times how influential Castro has been in his life; 
he read Castro’s works extensively when imprisoned after the 1992 coup, and Chávez has 
stated that Castro has served as a moral and ideological influence.  Chávez has 
undoubtedly also been inspired by Castro’s oratory skills. Both leaders are renown for 
their abilities to speak freely, without script, for hours on end, while amazingly still 
holding the awe-inspired attention of their audience.  Chávez says that they chat almost 
daily; he’s somewhere between a brother or a father figure49 giving Chávez advice on 
everything from his physical health and personal security to the country’s social welfare 
programs.50  
Evo Morales has quickly become a close ally and friend for Chávez, sharing a 
similar radicalism in image and oratorical style.  Anti-imperialism and nationalism 
characterize his political discourse and policy as well as his passionate rhetoric. Morales 
turned to Chávez’s successful example of regaining control over the country’s oil 
industry as a model for Bolivia’s natural gas reserves.  In May 2006, Morales reversed 
the privatization of Bolivia’s hydrocarbons, set in place by previous governments, and 
announced that foreign companies engaged in the Bolivian gas industry would now pay 
increased royalties on all profits, consequently upsetting Brazil and Spain, its two 
principal investors.51  
  In the current political climate of Latin America, Lula is considered the leading 
moderate of the leftist trend.  Chávez and Lula have demonstrated a mutual desire to 
build stronger ties between their two countries.  In December 2004 on a presidential visit 
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to Brazil, Chávez told reporters that despite obvious differences, both leaders have the 
same goal, a goal that he described as turning South America into a power bloc that could 
bring the world the political balance and peace it so badly needs.52  Lula, like Chávez, 
wants to strengthen the region, but is more cautious about how this should be done.  Lula 
has shown himself to be a strong advocate of Latin American integration, particularly in 
leading a more “reasoned” campaign of objection to the U.S.’s Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA).   
Another staunch ally lies in President Néstor Kirchner of Argentina.  This 
regional leader has a great deal to offer, despite Argentina’s recent economic meltdown 
in 2001/2.  Kirchner’s December 2001 defiant refusal to adhere to the IMF’s demands on 
debt repayment set the tone of his political posture, demonstrating his boldness of spirit 
in economic reform.  Along with Lula, Kirchner has eagerly played a central role in Latin 
American resistance to the FTAA.  Buenos Aires hosted the Summit of the Americas in 
November 2005, where Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, and Uruguay were able to block 
Bush’s effort to reopen discussion on the issue.   Kirchner opened the summit with open 
disapproval and criticism of U.S. policies in Latin America.53 
 Building strategic relationships is absolutely crucial to the Bolivarian movement, 
and has been very successful thus far.  As Chávez says, “we have always had friends in 
the world, but since April 2002, we have millions of friends.”54  This is largely a result of 
Chávez’s active efforts in diplomatic affairs. He has built strong personal relationships 
with several regional leaders. He is often photographed embracing his Latin American 
counterparts, or raising their arms in a triumphant cheer.  He always speaks fondly of his 
allies in public speeches and interviews, extending his gratitude for their friendship and 
political support.  In a 2005 interview, Chávez stated, “everyday the position that we 
defend draws more supporters in the world.”  He gave the example of the 2004 World 
Trade Organization (WTO) summit in Cancun, where “before [we] were alone now there 
are many defending [our] way.”55  Chávez’s growing popularity around the world and 
among international leaders validates this claim.  
 These positive relationships have not been taken for granted by Chávez.  He 
frequently extols the virtues of his friends.  He speaks frequently of Castro in admiration 
of Cuba’s historic struggle, in gratification for assistance in the Missions, and simply for 
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Castro’s personal camaraderie.  He has often come to Castro’s defense at international 
meetings.  At the January 2004 Summit of the Americas in Monterrey, Mexico, Chávez 
was furious when Bush, in Castro’s absence, launched an attack on the leader.   He 
proudly talks of how he was the only one to defend Cuba and was pleased when “they 
told me Bush was burning with anger.”56   
 While Chávez is unreserved in his criticism of his opponents, he carefully avoids 
any criticism of his allies.  In an interview with German journalist, Niemeyer, Chávez 
was asked his opinion of Lula and Kirchner’s rapprochement in their critical position 
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).57 Chávez’s contempt for the IMF is well 
documented; Chávez considers both the IMF and the World Bank as “most perverse 
mechanisms”58 and “instruments of neoliberalism.”59 However, Chávez took care to 
show loyalty to his valued allies, saying, “I can’t speak for that, I know only the depths o
my own problems in Venezuela, but I do know...that they are friends.”
f 
lso 60  Chávez a
defended Lula on the corruption scandal plaguing his government; “I am absolutely 
certain that Lula is an honest man, a great partner,” adding that this controversy is 
probably due to smear tactics “of the “old political class, of the Brazilian right.”61  One 
political commentator speculates that Chávez’s recent deal with Brazil to buy thirty-six 
oil tankers for $3 billion is a timely attempt to bolster Lula’s image and help his prospects 
of being re-elected in October 2006.62  
  Chávez frequently demonstrates his esteem for regional allies in public address in 
Venezuela and abroad.  This 2002 speech in Caracas is a typical example:  After mention 
of improved relations within Latin America, Chávez cried, “Viva Lula y el Brasil” and 
enthusiastic echoes of “Viva!” followed.  This proceeded with “Viva Kirchner y el 
Argentina”, “Viva el Ecuador and their new president”, as well as other thanks given to 
countries that have extended support and friendship.63 
Chávez uses shared ideological views to unify Latin American leadership against 
U.S. dominance, and has offered some practical incentives to sway traditional economic 
dependencies.  Because of Chávez’s impassioned attempts to unite Latin America, with 
the power of oil resources behind him, the Bolivarian dream is becoming more of a 
reality.  The region seems to be moving toward independent policies and economic 
integration, as many have rejected the FTAA and endorsed collaborative regional 
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projects.  Chávez and the Bolivarian Movement are partly responsible for these changes.  
Chávez’s innovative plans for Latin American economic and political integration have 
made significant progress.  His radical image and policy, his personal approach to 
diplomacy, and his compelling rhetoric are important aspects of his success. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Hugo Chávez has been remarkably successful, owing to the support given by two 
groups: the Venezuelan majority, who by their faith have entrusted Chávez with the 
resources of oil-rich Venezuela and empowered him to revolutionize the country’s social, 
economic and political structure; and the Latin American community, specifically the 
leaders of allied nations, who have supported Chávez’s international initiatives through 
increased regional trade, cooperative programming, and political solidarity.   
 Chávez’s unique style, which can be classified as populist, is a major factor in 
explaining his success.   In his political career, Chávez has met all the requirements of the 
populist definition.  He has exhibited remarkable charisma and personalist appeal with 
almost unmatched skills in oration.  His vague Bolivarian ideology largely centers upon 
the creation of an enemy, using categories of “us” and “them” to legitimize political 
actions.  Because of the latter, Chávez’s loyal following - made up of mostly the poor, 
but also includes support from some of the military - has mobilized frequently in the 
streets of Venezuela. Chávez has also dismantled formal political institutions, another 
populist characteristic. In fact, one of the reasons he was elected was because of his 
promise to radically reform the Venezuelan political system.  Party structures are also 
lacking, as Chávez’s MVR remains a loose alliance of various party banners, and the 
grassroots Bolivarian Circles have developed as an alternative to traditional party 
organizations.  Economically, the proposed trade agreement, ALBA, the oil enterprise, 
PetroAmerica, and Chávez’s opposition to neoliberalism and capitalism are all based in 
classical populist principles of wealth redistribution and the social responsibility of 
government. 
The poor sectors of Venezuela have embraced Chávez as more than simply the 
nation’s president, but as an extraordinary leader of historic magnitude and also as a 
personal friend to many.  Chavistas have demonstrated their love and their loyalty time 
and time again.  Most recently, on December 3, 2006, Chávez was re-elected for a third 
time1 with 63% of the popular vote.  With so many elections and demonstrations, 
Chávez’s popularity in Venezuela is indisputable.  Chávez’s bold political ideas, and the 
policies instituted out of them, have proven his sincerity and reliability in the eyes of his 
supporters. As part of Chávez’s discourse, history plays a prominent role.  References to 
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Venezuela’s political and economic past draw upon the people’s experience and reshape 
their understanding of the way history instructs on the present, making the Bolivarian 
cause all the more worthy.  Most notably, the threat of the Venezuelan oligarchy and the 
U.S. imperialists incite the people to support efforts to protect their political sovereignty 
and economic resources.  But, this alone would not produce the kind of fierce loyalty 
Chávez enjoys from many Venezuelans.  An important element is his very personable 
style.  His interaction with the public is natural, amiable, and frequent, causing some 
people to feel an intimate bond with their president. Chávez’s unique style and image 
have captured the allegiance of the Venezuelan majority.  His ethnicity and social 
upbringing have granted him a degree of instant approval among the poor. 
 Bolivarianism is much more than simply a Venezuelan project.  Its scope is also 
international.  The impact of Chávez and his vision have had tremendous influence on 
South America.  A great amount of energy has been dedicated to developing stronger 
relations among Latin American countries, and the effects can be clearly seen in 
economic partnerships and new political alliances.   
Chávez’s radicalism is appealing to many because it represents a break from the 
past, which has been negatively tainted by dictatorships, political interference, economic 
hardships, etc.  A wind of change is blowing throughout Latin America.  The new left is 
on the rise, and the indigenous communities have found their voices in newly elected 
leaders of their own ethnicity.  A radical shifting of loyalties is evident in new industrial 
or infrastructural projects, media ventures, increased trade, and intergovernmental 
meetings and organizations.   
 Chávez has been a key figure in all of this.  Harsh criticism of U.S. policy and 
warnings of encroachment and interference touched upon underlying resentments and 
strikes a chord with many Latin American leaders and citizens alike.  Whether or not they 
choose to defy the U.S. in the way Chávez does, Chávez’s fierce anti-Americanism has 
been effective in international relations.  Chávez’s rhetoric has gathered quite a following 
worldwide, and in it, historical references and support from other world figures are 
prominently featured.   Also, personable and charismatic diplomacy by Chávez has 
resulted in several strong alliances with other regional leaders as well as several intimate 
friendships.  Chávez’s loyalty to his allies has been apparent in many instances.  The 
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heightened profile of Venezuela in Latin American affairs, and the many agreements 
signed between Venezuela and other South American nations are a measure of Chávez’s 
success. 
Over the past few years, critics and admirers alike have anxiously awaited 
Chávez’s next move, and both scholars and reporters have attempted to assess his place 
in Venezuelan and Latin American politics. In this study, I have tried to situate Chávez in 
the historical framework of populism in Latin America.  I have also drawn out key 
elements of his political style and public image to help explain his appeal.  It is my hope 
that this thesis will contribute to a better understanding of this complex and influential 
leader. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Chávez’s first term was 1999-2000.  The new Constitution, passed in July 1999, 
expanded the length of the presidential term to six years instead of four.  A presidential 
election was then called, which Chávez won, giving him a mandate to serve from 2000 to 
2006. 
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